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Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government
Michael C. Dorf
Charles F. Sabel 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000)
Despite the continuing "war on drugs," the last decade has wit-
nessed the creation and nationwide spread of a remarkable set of insti-
tutions, drug treatment courts. In drug treatment court, a criminal
defendant pleads guilty or otherwise accepts responsibility for a
charged offense and accepts placement in a court-mandated program of
drug treatment. The judge and court personnel closely monitor the
defendant's performance in the program and the program's capacity to
serve the mandated client. The federal government and national asso-
ciations in turn monitor the local drug treatment courts and dissemi-
nate successful practices. The ensemble of institutions, monitoring, and
pooling exemplifies what the authors have elsewhere called "experimen-
talism."
The authors argue here that treatment courts as open and evolv-
ing experimentalist institutions point one way beyond the conventional
limitation of courts and other institutions. By pooling information on
good and bad performance, and sanctioning when necessary unsatis-
factory performers, the courts enable and oblige improvement by the
actors both individually and as members of a complex ensemble. Judi-
cial involvement in reform is permanent and continuous in this model.
Yet it is, paradoxically, less imperious than traditional methods of
court-directed reform for two reasons. First, the court in effect compels
the actors to learn continuously and incrementally from each other
rather than instructing them to implement a comprehensive remedial
plan devised by the court alone or even in consultation with the parties.
Second, the court is itself compelled to change in response to the
changes it facilitates. In part this occurs through the exchanges with
the treatment providers and in part it occurs in response to compari-
sons with experience in other jurisdictions as revealed by national
pooling. Thus, the article argues, the experimentalist architecture of the
drug courts suggests that they and like institutions need not face a
strict tradeoff between efficacy and accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, official drug policy in the United States has
amounted to a war by the criminal justice system on traffickers in and
users of drugs. More than half of all prison inmates are illegal drug
users, 1 and each year brings additional legislation mandating long
minimum sentences and other forms of harsh punishment for those
who violate the drug laws. Criticism mounts apace. Mindful of the
rigors of public opinion, the politically prudent, citing studies of the
* Michael C. Dorf is Vice-Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Charles F.
Sabel is Professor of Law and Social Science, Columbia Law School. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the comments, criticisms, and other forms of assistance of Robert Brennan, Ronald
Capozzoli, Sherry Colb, Alesia Donner, Jeffrey Fagan, Jo Ann Ferdinand, Jonathan Fichter,
Barry Friedman, Archon Fung, Jason Golub, Charles Honig, James Liebman, Valerie Raine,
John Rosenthal, Jane Spinak, and Shane Stansbury.
1. "According to recent data from the 1997 Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring ("ADAM')
program-which interviews and collects urine samples from arrestees in 23 major metropolitan
areas-between 51 and 80 percent of arrested adult males test positive for drugs." OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORT 19 (Fiscal Year 1998) (visited Aug. 6, 1999)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/98anrpt/chap3.htm>. Data for 1998, based on an expanded sample,
were similar. See Nat'l Inst. of Justice, 1998 Annual Report on Drug Use Among Adult &
Juvenile Arrestees, (visited Aug. 6, 1999) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/175656.htm>.
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ratio of costs to benefits of treatment as opposed to incarceration,
question the efficacy of addressing drug addiction through the crimi-
nal justice system. Other critics, less attentive to the polls and influ-
enced by the experiences of countries such as the Netherlands, argue
for decriminalization and social policies aimed principally at limiting
the harm that long-term addicts do to themselves and those around
them.
Despite these seemingly intractable differences, important
changes in the treatment of drug offenders are occurring within the
very criminal justice system that is at the center of public controversy.
The principal instrument of this transformation is variously called a
drug court, treatment court, or drug treatment court. Variations in
nomenclature and the precise details of their operation aside, treat-
ment courts around the country share the same basic pattern. Persons
charged with relatively low-level, non-violent criminal misconduct
may opt out of the criminal trial court if the prosecuting attorney
consents to the filing of charges in the treatment court. In treatment
court, the defendant pleads guilty or otherwise accepts responsibility
for a charged offense and accepts placement in a court-mandated
program of drug treatment. In some model programs, offenders may
initially choose among different courses of treatment-residential or
outpatient-according to their own assessment of their needs and
possibilities. The judge and court personnel closely monitor the defen-
dant's performance in the program and the program's capacity to
serve the mandated client. If progress in the treatment regime is
unsatisfactory, courts offering various programs may require the
offender to choose another, more intensive one. Upon successful com-
pletion of the treatment program, the conviction is typically expunged.
The drug court, moreover, will cease directing defendants to programs
that show signs of incompetence and increase referrals to others that
show greater promise.
Treatment courts thus provide defendants with alternatives to
incarceration without decriminalizing drug use. Further, in insisting
on a high, perhaps increasing quality of care from service providers,
they improve the treatment available to drug users. In changing our
conception of addiction and how treatment can respond to it, drug
courts will likely reshape the background ideas that crucially influ-
ence what we regard as criminal behavior and how we respond to it.
Drug courts bear a superficial, but ultimately misleading
resemblance to long-established judicial and administrative institu-
tions. Thus, treatment courts do have affinities with the many
existing courts of specialized jurisdiction-juvenile courts, family
courts, and bankruptcy courts, among others-created to handle
[Vol. 53:831832
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problems with which generalist judges hearing a wide range of cases
are insufficiently familiar. As in treatment courts, judges in these
institutions typically cooperate so closely with corresponding adminis-
trative, not-for-profit, or private-sector organizations as to constitute
an integral part of the latter. Alternatively, we might understand the
drug courts principally as a kind of administrative body-given that
pleas in these courts are a foregone conclusion, and hence that "sen-
tencing" is automatic, we might see their principal activity to consist
in monitoring the behavior of sentenced clients in the manner of a
probation agency.
Although treatment courts no doubt build upon prior practices
of conventional courts and probation departments, we argue in this
Article that they cannot be neatly categorized as either courts or agen-
cies. Unlike traditional courts of specialized jurisdiction, drug courts
are creating the framework for a pervasive reform of the service pro-
viders with whom they collaborate in the very act of coordinating the
services provided. Unlike traditional administrative agencies, drug
courts neither provide services themselves nor regulate in detail, by
rule-making or other means, the activities of those who do. Thus, drug
courts are more intimately involved in the redirection of the institu-
tions they supervise, and upon which they rely than other, apparently
similar courts. Yet, simultaneously, they are more distant from these
institutions-at least as measured by their use of the means of ad-
ministrative techniques-than agencies with analogous tasks.
What makes the drug courts distinctive and innovative, we
argue, is the novel form of monitoring, and governance more gener-
ally, upon which they rely.2 The central feature of this governance
system is that the monitored agents choose their own precise goals
and the means for achieving them in return for furnishing a central
authority with the information that allows evaluation of their per-
formance. The information, in turn, allows identification of good and
2. In focusing on monitoring mechanisms, we do not mean to overlook the attitudinal
distinctions between drug courts and traditional courts that have led some to classify the former
as practitioners of "therapeutic jurisprudence." See Peggy F. Hora et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice
System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 439 (1999)
(discussing the drug treatment court movement and therapeutic jurisprudence); David Rottman
& Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem-Solving Courts, 240
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE J. 12, 15 (1999) ("Drug treatment courts are the best known example of a
court for which therapeutic jurisprudence arguably provides the underlying legal theory.); see
generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (1996) (defining therapeutic jurisprudence). But in our view,
a therapeutic attitude, if unconnected to systemic monitoring mechanisms, risks capriciousness.
See infra Part II (discussing the history of juvenile courts).
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bad performers, improvement of the quality of the monitored informa-
tion, and eventually, of the services provided. Very generally, by
collaborating in this way, central authority and decentralized actors
can together explore and evaluate solutions to complex problems that
neither alone would have been likely to identify, much less investigate
or address, without the exchanges with the others. The same
exchanges of information, moreover, enable the institutions continu-
ally to adjust their means and ends in the light of experience. Because
this form of governance and the type of institution-building with
which it is associated openly acknowledges the incomplete and am-
biguous character of its initial specification of means and ends, and
uses this lack of specificity as a prod to inquiry and discovery, we refer
to it as experimentalist.3
In the case of drug courts, the experimentalist process occurs
iteratively. At the national level, the federal government pools infor-
mation on the innovative activities of local drug courts and extracts
benchmarks and framework rules from these. Within their jurisdic-
tions, in closely monitoring the progress of each client, the drug courts
simultaneously monitor and discipline the activities of treatment
providers and those with whom they collaborate. We will see that drug
courts are able to determine which programs can effectively monitor
the progress of individual clients, and which clients are able to take
advantage of capable programs. Indeed, the drug court, as we describe
it below, took shape through just such a process of pooled evaluation of
local experimentation.
Viewed as an instance of experimentalist governance, treat-
ment courts suggest an effective response to a general problem that
has beset the judiciary in recent decades. Beginning in the post-Brown
v. Board of Education4 period, courts became increasingly involved in
reordering large and complex institutions that were failing to meet
constitutional obligations: racially discriminatory police forces; schools
that did not provide a minimally adequate education; and severely
overcrowded prisons were prominent examples. There were some
notable successes-the desegregation of schools in the rural South
3. See generally Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (describing a new form of government called
democratic experimentalism in which power is decentralized and information pooling is used to
forumulate solutions to problems).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). To be more precise, the era on which we
focus begins with Brown II, see Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), in which the
Supreme Court delegated to the lower federal courts the task of formulating remedial decrees.
5. See infra notes 8-13.
[Vol. 53:831834
2000] DRUG TREATMENT COURTS 835
and the improvement of prison conditions.' Based on these successes,
optimistic observers of this role shift foresaw an age in which courts
would focus on institutional reform rather than individual remedies.!
But the successes were limited to unusual contexts. For exam-
ple, segregation in the rural South typically took the form of one set of
schools for white children and a second, duplicative but typically
inferior set for black children. Once it was recognized that such a form
of apartheid violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection,8
there was a ready solution: when the black schools were closed, there
was no practical alternative to educating black and white
schoolchildren in the same, facilities.' In this instance, stopping a clear
constitutional violation proved to be a sufficient remedy.
By contrast, when the scene shifted to urban areas, orders to
cease assigning students by race left in place substantial de facto
segregation (and contributed to an exodus to the suburbs), prompting
urgent and politically divisive questions about the goals of deseg-
regation."0 Addressing these issues called for complex managerial
6. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING &
THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998) (arguing that
judges have always made policy and will continue to do so because the modern administrative
state requires an active policy making judiciary). Rubin and Feeley argue that courts succeeded
in ending some of the most abusive prison conditions because of "their capacity to act like
agencies in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 334. We agree with their view that the
institutions of American government should not be narrowly circumscribed by pre-conceived
notions of role, but we doubt that the conventional administrative model is generalizable.
Prisons may have been a particularly good target for top-down reform because they are
quintessentially hierarchical entities. Even still, judicial reform of prisons was, as Rubin and
Feeley note, significantly constrained by public opinion. See id. at 332.
7. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the role of the judiciary in public law litigation); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(addressing structural reform and the process by which judges give meaning to public values);
Owen M. Fiss, Symposium" The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilities in the
Administrative State: The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1442-50 (1983)
(examining the impact of the bureaucratization of the judiciary).
8. This "recognition" required more than the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. The pace
of desegregation increased dramatically with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 380-81 (1994); JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THIRTY
YEARS AFTER BROWN 3 (1985) ("Most of the decline in racial isolation occurred between 1968 and
1972.').
9. For this reason, the Court's repudiation of the Brown II formula of "all deliberate speed"
enabled swift desegregation in the rural South, despite an at-best ambivalent Nixon
Administration. See GREENBERG, supra note 8, at 384-87. For an instructive case study
highlighting the role of federal authorities, see GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOUTHERN EDUCATION 253-56 (1969) (discussing Sussex County, Virginia).
10. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 8, at 17-22 (offering three conflicting interpretations of
Brown).
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capacities that seemed beyond those possessed by courts.1 Thus, by
the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court had placed strict limits on the
scope of federal judicial power to remedy segregation. These reflected
an unwillingness to embrace any but the most parsimonious inter-
pretation of Brown-de jure segregation must cease-an unwilling-
ness inspired in large part by a deep skepticism about courts' legiti-
macy and abilities in ordering complex and controversial institutional
change." Urban school desegregation thus appears as a prominent
example of a larger phenomenon-conventionally understood, courts
have had difficulty improving the performance of troubled insti-
tutions. 3
To be sure, at least one observer saw in the forms of collabora-
tion indirectly provoked by the courts' efforts at remediation a new
model of judicial oversight, more dependent on continual re-elabo-
ration and reconsideration of the favored means and ends of interested
parties than typically possible within conventional litigation."' But the
center of gravity of opinion has, since the heady days of the mid-1960s
to early 1970s, moved steadily towards an understanding of courts
11. See GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978).
Although Orfield answers "yes" to the question that is the title of his book, he clearly takes for
granted that desegregating urban areas-whether in the South or the North-would be a much
more complex undertaking than desegregating the rural South. See, e.g., id. at 421 ('There is no
simple solution to the problems of school segregation, which flourishes in our aging metropolitan
communities.").
12. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (holding that a
court cannot order racial balance as a remedy for demographic shifts); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (invalidating an inter-district remedy for an intra-district violation, despite
district court finding that substantial desegregation required the former).
13. For skeptical accounts of the courts' effect with respect to school desegregation, see
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 113 (1987)
(expressing skepticism with respect to the judicial role in desegregating schools); GERALD
ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 9-28 (1991) (same).
But see WILLIS D. HAWLEY, STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION: LESSONS FROM
RESEARCH 41-43 (1983) (setting forth considerations that should be addressed in decisions about
school racial compositions); F. WELCH & A. LIGHT, NEW EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE 6, 8, 18-21, at tbls. 8-11, 61, 92 (1987)
(indicating statistical changes in white and minority school enrollment before, during, and after
desegregation plan implementation).
14. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357,
1360 (1991) (developing "a deliberative model of remedial decisionmaking that casts the court in
the role of structuring and evaluating the adequacy of a participatory process designed to
produce a consensual remedial solution"); Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections
Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 644 (1993) (in the context of prison reform litigation,
"document[ing] a shift from a test case to an implementation model of advocacy, and urg[ing] the
development of effective remedial strategies as a method of linking litigation to a broader
strategy'); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 987-91 (1993)
(challenging the assumption that rights of participation should be the same in the remedial
phase of litigation as in the liability phase).
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that holds their capacities for implementing reform to be inherently
quite limited."
In this Article, we argue that treatment courts, as open and
evolving experimentalist institutions, point one way beyond the con-
ventional limitations of courts and other oversight institutions. By
pooling information on good and bad performance, and sanctioning
when necessary unsatisfactory performers, the courts enable and
oblige improvement by the actors both individually and as members of
a complex ensemble. Judicial involvement in reform is permanent and
continuous in this model. Yet it is, paradoxically, less imperious than
traditional methods of court-directed reform for two reasons. First, the
court in effect compels the actors to learn continuously and incre-
mentally from each other rather than instructing them to implement a
comprehensive remedial plan devised by the court alone or even in
consultation with the parties. Second, the court is itself compelled to
change in response to the changes it facilitates. This occurs in part
through the exchanges with the treatment providers and in part in
response to comparisons with experience in other jurisdictions as
revealed by national pooling.
At the same time, treatment courts-along with other emer-
gent experimentalist bodies-point the way beyond a parallel dilemma
that has long been taken to be a defining feature and limit of bureau-
cratic administration, the conflict between accountability and the
flexibility required for effectiveness. Detailed statutes or regulations
provide a reliable yardstick against which to measure implementation
and so to establish the accountability of agency officials. But in a
complex and rapidly changing world it is manifestly impossible to
write rules that cover the particulars of current circumstances in any
sphere of activity. Indeed, the difficulty of achieving tolerably accept-
able results is typically a compelling argument against efforts to ad-
just the rules, once written, to changes in the settings to which they
are applied. Consequently, to harmonize rules and reality, officials
often bend the language of their directives to suit the demands of the
situation. This increases the effectiveness of the organization, but at
the cost of its accountability-the same act of interpretive discretion
that (re)establishes the connection between purposes and procedures,
introduces ambiguities into the overarching directives, and thus
undermines their utility as the measuring rods of accountability.
15. Cass Sunstein makes this point about the United States Supreme Court, see generally
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999),
but it well describes the standard, chastened view of the judiciary as a whole.
2000] 837
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Experimentalism avoids this dilemma by authorizing the exer-
cise of discretion under conditions that provide for accountability. As
this Article will show, in the case of the relation between the federal
government and treatment courts as well as the relation between
treatment courts and treatment providers, lower-level units are
encouraged to redefine ends in the light of changed understandings of
means, and vice versa. But as a condition of this autonomy the respec-
tively local entities must in effect render themselves accountable by
providing explanations of their motives and reports on their results
rich enough to allow critical comparisons with the different choices of
others acting under similar conditions. Thus, just as the treatment
court-viewed as an instance of an experimentalist judiciary-avoids
the false dichotomy of managerial meddling versus inaction by
reviewing the pooled remedial plans of the actors, so the court and the
corresponding units of the federal executive-viewed as instances of
experimentalist administration-by the same means avoid the false
dichotomy of furtive effectiveness versus formalist accountability.
Part I of this Article describes the way in which treatment
courts function and calls attention to their novel features. Our charac-
terization is based on a review of the literature and discussions with
persons working for and with treatment courts throughout the United
States. We focused particular attention on the Brooklyn Treatment
Court, the nation's largest treatment court and a model for others in
New York and beyond. '6 We recount the origins of treatment courts, as
well as their philosophy, structure, and connections to the treatment
providers. We describe their emergence as well as their spread and
modification through the pooling efforts of the federal government. In
our description of both the national and local features of the emergent
system, we focus on the reconceptualization of addiction as a chronic
disease, 7 rather than an expression of moral breakdown. Thus, the
16. Although this Article uses procedures of the Brooklyn Treatment Court to illustrate the
general pattern, discussions were also held with those familiar with treatment courts in Buffalo,
New York; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Kalamazoo, Michigan; Franklin, Louisiana; Stillwater,
Oklahoma; and Los Angeles, California. These discussions confirmed that the patterns and
practices we observed in Brooklyn were characteristic of drug treatment courts generally.
17. For the view of addiction as a disease, see National Institutes of Health, Scientists
Identify Brain Systems Involved in Drug Craving, (visited Oct. 14, 1996) <http://www.nih.gov/
news/pr/oct96/nida-14.htm> (explaining details of study that identified major areas of the brain
activated during drug craving by cocaine addicts); J. Madelaine Nash, Addicted, TIME, May 5,
1997 (describing why people become addicted to controlled substances); Interview by Jerry
Stilkind with Dr. Alan Leshner, Director of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, Addiction is a
Brain Disease, available at 2 USIA ELECTRONIC J. (June 1997) <http:l/www.usia.gov/




court views relapse not as a sign of failure but as an all but inevitable
feature of addiction and (potentially) recovery. The chief tool employed
by the treatment court consists of finely tuned "treatment bands," that
prescribe measured responses to successes as well as setbacks. We
show how the mandate that service providers continually inform the
court about the progress (or lack thereof) of each client 8 enables the
court to customize the legal system's response to individuals, while
simultaneously monitoring the treatment providers themselves. From
the perspective taken by treatment courts, addiction is like many
other contemporary problems in that an effective response requires
contextualized or situation-specific coordination of many different and
changing services. In this sense, promising reform of the treatment of
addiction is more generally instructive.
Part II refines the characterization of treatment courts as
experimentalist institutions by contrasting that model with two coun-
ter-interpretations. In the first, treatment courts represent a return to
the ideal of individualized sentencing. According to this view, the
spread of treatment courts merely reflects the latest pendular swing
between accountability-here understood to mean determinate sen-
tences-and effectiveness-understood in this model to mean the
vesting of therapeutic discretion in judges or others." We reject this
view by showing that there are monitoring mechanisms that overcome
the tradeoff between effectiveness and accountability by making ac-
tors accountable for the exercise of discretion.
But our rejection of the pendular account leaves open a second
possibility-that the coordination mechanisms to which we point are
just recrudescent professionalism, understood as decentralized coordi-
nation of individualized services. In this view, the transformations in
role that occur in treatment courts do not mark the emergence of a
new kind of institution but simply the redrawing of professional
boundaries. We reject this characterization and argue that the
boundaries between roles are more open and the kinds of knowledge
are more formalized (as opposed to tacit) than in the professionalist
model. We will see that these features are intrinsic to what we are
calling experimentalist institutions.
18. We refer to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the treatment court as "clients" to
emphasize that they are consumers of social services. See Claire McCaskill, Combat Drug Court:
An Innovative Approach to Dealing with Drug Abusing First Time Offenders, 66 UMKC L. REV.
493, 495 (1998) (describing one county's efforts to stop criminal activity and substance abuse).
19. In the version of this argument to which we respond, what we are calling effectiveness
and discretion are closely connected to the rehabilitative ideal that the criminal justice system
has, in recent years, largely abandoned in favor of deterrence, isolation, and retribution.
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Part III pursues criticisms of drug courts from the point of view
of both those who would improve them by more thoroughly applying
their animating ideas and those with civil libertarian objections to
those ideas themselves. The first, sympathetic, critique, focuses on
gaps in the monitoring regime and suggests ways of correcting these.
The second critique concerns both the civil liberties of those subject to
treatment at the hands of the court and the danger that the courts'
very success could lead to a menacing extension of the reach of the
criminal justice system. We argue that the monitoring regime can
address the first but not the second set of concerns. We will see that
the answer to these lies not in abandonment of drug courts but in
improving the system of drug treatment available outside the criminal
justice system.
Part IV raises and responds to questions about the democratic
legitimacy of the drug court system and similar experimentalist
regimes. Within the conventional model of representative democracy,
elected legislatures legitimate policies by enacting them or, in the
administrative model, by delegating problem-solving authority to
agencies. Yet drug courts and other experimentalist institutions are
developing rapidly with apparently minimal input from the polity. We
argue that the appearance is false because democratic legitimacy is
conferred by the experimentalist institutions' connections to local
communities and their use of directly deliberative problem-solving
techniques. Moreover, there are points of intersection between the old
and new institutions, so that continued interaction may lead to a
transformation of the roles of the former. Most prominently, in the
fully developed experimentalist architecture we sketch, the legisla-
ture's role will consist of authorizing and monitoring experimentalist
solutions to broadly defined problems that it identifies. Thus, Part IV
concludes that experimentalism does not so much pose a threat of a
parallel and unaccountable government, as it offers the opportunity
for reimagining accountable government.
Throughout this Article, we argue that within an emergent
experimentalist system, courts can play a role that is not traditionally
judicial. By way of conclusion we ask whether there is nonetheless a
distinctively judicial function for courts within an experimentalist
regime, and conclude, with reference to treatment courts, that there
is. Because experimentalist courts are better positioned than conven-
tional courts to measure the effectiveness of the institutions and
actors they evaluate, they are also better equipped to carry out the by-
now established role of protecting constitutional values and rights
than are the latter. Experimentalism thus marries accountability and
[Vol. 53:831840
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effectiveness in a way that proves particularly valuable in a judicial
setting.
I. THE EXPERIMENTALIST ARCHITECTURE OF THE DRUG TREATMENT
COURT NETWORK
Treatment courts, like many other experimentalist institutions,
emerged through a combination of, on the one hand, local innovation
and on the other, central information-pooling and discipline that blurs
the distinction between accident and design. The immediate impetus
for change at the local level was the crack cocaine epidemic of the
1980s and a concurrent reconceptualization of the nature of addiction.
Widespread use of crack cocaine led to state and federal legislation
mandating serious penalties for drug traffickers and users."0 The
application of these laws threatened to overwhelm the criminal justice
system, and more efficient techniques of case management were at
best moderately effective palliatives."' Thus, many of the actors
involved in the criminal justice system actively sought more effective
alternatives to incarceration.
Changing ideas about the nature of addiction and the potential
for treatment suggested, meanwhile, that the search need not be
fruitless. Credible research showed that many different kinds of
treatment could measurably reduce the severity, duration, and
frequency of spells of addiction.' Refinements in the form of treatment
presumably could produce still better results. Perhaps more funda-
mentally, addiction was coming to be redefined as a chronic relapsing
condition. There was unlikely to be a straight path from addiction to
recovery; rather, addicts undertaking recovery could be expected to
relapse into addiction, often many times. This suggested the need for a
counter-intuitive combination of sanctions and forbearance in treat-
ment. Sanctions were necessary to demonstrate palpably that relapse
was costly, but forbearance was necessary to help the addict learn
20. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4231 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
21. See STEVEN BELENKO & TAMARA DUMANOvSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Pub. No. NCJ-144531, PROGRAM BRIEF: SPECIAL DRUG COURTS 9-11 (1993)
(describing "expedited case management courts" as a development parallel to the creation of drug
treatment courts); William D. McColl, Comment, Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory
and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 471-72 (1996) (describing types of drug
courts).
22. See generally C. PETER RYDELL & SUSAN S. EVERINGHAM, CONTROLLING COCAINE:
SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS (1994) (finding that drug treatment was substantially more
cost-effective than source-country control, interdiction, or domestic enforcement).
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through experience to anticipate the conditions that triggered relapse
and the mechanisms for effectively avoiding it. Thus, whereas the
criminal justice system (and many treatment providers) previously
saw infractions of the rules of sobriety as a failure of will that belied
the dedication to and capability for recovery (and perhaps demon-
strated criminal intent), relapse came to be seen as providing a win-
dow into the mechanisms by which the addict could control addiction.
The result was a rapprochement between the criminal justice sys-
tem-which began to abandon the view that deterrence and punish-
ment were the only effective "therapies"--and treatment providers-
who not only softened their conviction that an uncoerced will to self-
correction was indispensable to recovery, but came to think that coer-
cion and its associated crisis could, like relapse itself, provoke benefi-
cial self-reflection.'
23. See Douglas B. Marlowe & Kimberly C. Kirby, Effective Use of Sanctions in Drug
Courts: Lessons from Behavioral Research, 2 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that
the success of drug courts is consistent with behavioral studies showing the effectiveness of
negative reinforcement and (humane) punishment in other contexts); id. at 3 ("Contrary to
expectations ... a substantial body of evidence indicates that legally mandated and coerced
clients generally perform as well or better than others in terms of treatment retention,
abstinence, and psychosocial functioning across a diverse range of settings.!) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, in part because of the history and remaining potential for abuse of involuntary
commitment, the ethics and efficacy of coerced treatment for mental illnesses other than
addiction continues to be controversial. Compare THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL
ILLNESS (1961), with Stephen L. Dilts, Jr., On the Szaszian Argument, 26 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
311 (1998) (addressing the argument that psychiatry is a rhetorical enterprise aimed at
providing justification for involuntary treatment); see also Charles W. Lidz, Coercion in
Psychiatric Care: What Have We Learned from Research?, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 631
(1998) (analyzing the limited but growing empirical evidence). Although abuses can occur in the
treatment of addiction as well, the addiction treatment community strongly endorses coercion as
one useful tool. One treatment provider with whom we spoke emphasized that "people don't just
wake up one morning and decide today is the day I'll quit my habit. It takes a crisis, like losing a
job or going to jail." Interview with Robert Brennan, Admissions Director, Phoenix House (Apr. 2,
1999). Nearly the same view was expressed by Ronald Capozzoli, see Interview with Ronald
Capoxxoli, Clinical Director of C.I.S. Addiction Center (Apr. 2, 1999), and is a standard
observation of the literature. See, e.g., Marianne T. Marcus, Changing Careers: Becoming Clean
and Sober in a Therapeutic Community, 8 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 466, 471 (1998) ("Whether
participants sought treatment on their own or were coerced to do so, they reported that entering
the program involved experiencing a crisis."). Despite the folk wisdom that a desire to recover is
central to recovery, there is thus an emerging consensus that mandated clients actually perform
better than voluntary ones. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1256 (1998) (noting that studies have shown
coerced addictions treatment to be more effective then voluntary treatment); David Farabee et
al., The Effectiveness of Coerced Treatment for Drug-Abusing Offenders, 62 FEDERAL
PROBATION 3 (1998); McColl, supra note 21, at 496, 500-01 (arguing that "to break the cycle of
recidivism and crime, there must be effective treatment of addicts); Sally L. Satel, Observational
Study of Courtroom Dynamics in Selected Drug Courts, 1 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 43, 45
(1998) (emphasizing drug courts' innovation by involving judges in the treatment of defendants);
Jeffrey Tauber, Treating Drug-Using Offenders through Sanctions, Incentives, CORRECTIONS
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Drug courts arose to give institutional effect to this new under-
standing. The first was established in Dade County, Florida in 1989.
Its central innovation was to require each client to appear in court
regularly, accompanied by the treatment provider's report on the
client's performance in its program.' This allowed the judge to impose
penalties for infractions if deemed necessary, or to reward good
behavior. It incidentally allowed the judge and the treatment court
staff to gauge the capabilities of the treatment providers, permitting
exclusion of those that were unable to meet report deadlines or to
provide sufficient or complete information. Thus, the straightforward
device of regular court appearances led naturally to simultaneous
monitoring of both clients and treatment providers.
These innovations diffused rapidly. They represented an out-
growth of a series of grass-roots initiatives that emphasized similarly
community-based team-oriented approaches in probation and parole
agencies as well as community policing programs.' By 1994, forty-two
TODAY, Feb. 1994, at 30 (describing the key factors for successful drug courts and court-ordered
drug rehabilitation programs). Although they do not dispute the value of coerced treatment,
sympathetic but critical observers of treatment courts caution "that if the percent of coerced
patients in treatment centers and self-help groups becomes too high, treatment becomes less
effective." Drug Courts and Coerced Treatment, Factsheet 11, (visited June 23, 1999)
<http://www.factadvocates.orgfactsheets/factsll.html>; see also generally Franklin G. Miller &
Glenn A. Miller, Mandated Addiction Services: Potential Ethical Dilemmas, in PRACTICING IN
THE NEW MENTAL HEALTH MARKETPLACE: ETHICAL, LEGAL, & MORAL ISSUES 169 (Richard F.
Small & Laurence R. Barnhill, eds., 1998) (describing the ethical issues associated with treating
mandated clients).
24. See Hora, supra note 2, at 481-85 (citing PETER FINN & ANDREA K. NEWLYN, MIAMI'S
"DRUG COURTO: A DIFFERENT APPROACH, NATL INST. OF JUSTICE PROGRAM Focus (1993)).
25. See DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 6
(1997) (discussing the background behind development of drug courts); see also Rottman &
Casey, supra note 2, at 13 (examining therapeutic jurisprudence and the resulting drive toward
problem solving by community focused orientation). The approach has also spread to treatment
of other disorders, such as mental illness. See CATHERINE CONLY, COORDINATING COMMUNITY
SERVICES FOR MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS: MARYLAND'S COMMUNITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
TREATMENT PROGRAM, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE PROGRAM FOCUS (1999) ("MCCJTP brings
treatment and criminal justice professionals together to screen mentally ill individuals while
they are confined in local jails, prepare treatment and aftercare plans for them, and provide
community follow-up after their release."). In the case of patients dually diagnosed with drug
addiction and mental illness, the stakes may be particularly high. Recent research shows that
while mentally ill patients are no more likely to commit acts of violence than the general
population, mentally ill drug or alcohol abusers do pose a greater risk of violence than non-
mentally ill drug or alcohol abusers. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People
Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods,
55 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1998) (noting that when the mental patient did not
abuse drugs or alcohol "there was no significant difference" between violence by mental patients
and the community at large). But cf. Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, New Evidence on the Violence
Risk Posed by People with Mental Illness, 55 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 403, 403 (1998)
(noting that studies over longer periods do show a link between mental illness and violence, even
absent substance abuse).
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drug courts had been started in the United States.' Their notable
successes led Congress, in 1994, to officialize the process of experi-
mentation under the aegis of the Department of Justice's Office of
Justice Programs ("OJP") Simultaneously, in 1994, personnel affili-
ated with twelve drug courts formed the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals ("NADCP").28 And in 1995:
The Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project (DCCTAP) was
established by the [OJP] at the U.S. Department of Justice to assist state and local
justice system officials and treatment professionals in addressing issues relating to
planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating drug court programs in their
jurisdictions. The DCCTAP began operating October 1, 1995 under the direction of The
American University."
Together these institutions link three inter-penetrating processes:
(1) diffusion of drug court fundamentals; (2) refinement of those fun-
damentals in operating procedures and framework rules that reflect
best practices; and (3) evaluation of the internal discipline and out-
comes of various drug courts.
Diffusion occurs through web-based and other publications' as
well as federal planning grants that require applicants to form imple-
menting teams consisting of at least a "judge, prosecutor, defense
attorney, treatment provider, project director, and an individual expe-
rienced in research, evaluation, or information system development."3
These team members (and perhaps others) must attend two OJP
training conferences on drug courts, and participate in a training
session conducted by a peer mentor.32 Once the teams become familiar
with the guidelines of basic practice, they are free to elaborate these
as local circumstances require. If they have difficulty in implementa-
tion, they can turn to consultants with expertise in the large-scale
26. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 8, GAO/GGD-97-106 (1997).
27. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii
(1994)) (authorizing the Attorney General to utilize any component of the Department of Justice
to implement the program).
28. See NADCP Backgrounder (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.drugcourt.orgt-
backgrnd.cfm> (explaining the founding and growth of the NADCP).
29. Fact Sheet, Drug Court Clearinghouse & Technical Assistance Project (visited Jan. 27,
2000) <http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/justice/factsheet.html>.
30. For example, in 1998 the National Drug Court Institute began publishing the National
Drug Court Institute Review, its goal "to keep the drug court practitioner abreast of important
new developments in the drug court field." Introduction, 1 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. ii
(Summer 1998).
31. Office of Justice Programs, Drug Court Grant Program Fiscal Year 1999 Program
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reorganization that the creation of a drug court may require.33 As a
condition of the federal awards, grantees must furnish periodic reports
on their progress. These reports, together with more systematic
evaluations, provide current material for continuing redefinition of the
drug court.
Thus, even as diffusion occurs, the principles defining drug
courts are re-articulated through continuous exchanges of technical
materials (through NADCP and DCCTAP) and periodically (and more
emphatically), through the articulation of core standards. Thus, for
example, the NADCP convened a meeting of a Drug Courts Standards
Committee under a grant awarded by the federal DCPO. The
resulting standards, published in 1997, describe ten key components
of drug courts, including providing an integrated, non-adversarial
program of treatment and monitoring in which the judge plays a
central role. The impacts of programs are continuously evaluated. A
typical component states a principle and its motivating ideal in the
drug court philosophy, followed by a "benchmark' consisting of
minimal operating procedures for implementing the principle. For
example, Key Component 6 states generally: "A coordinated strategy
governs drug court responses to participants' compliance."34 It states
further:
Purpose: An established principle of AOD treatment is that addiction is a chronic,
relapsing condition. A pattern of decreasing frequency of use before sustained
abstinence from alcohol and other drugs is common. Becoming sober or drug free is a
learning experience, and each relapse to AOD use may teach something about the
recovery process.
Implemented in the early stages of treatment and emphasized throughout, therapeutic
strategies aimed at preventing the return to AOD use help participants learn to
manage their ambivalence toward recovery, identify situations that stimulate AOD
cravings, and develop skills to cope with high-risk situations. Eventually, participants
learn to manage cravings, avoid or deal more effectively with high-risk situations, and
maintain sobriety for increasing lengths of time.
A participant's progress through the drug court experience is measured by his or her
compliance with the treatment regimen. Certainly cessation of drug use is the ultimate
goal of drug court treatment. However, there is value in recognizing incremental
progress toward the goal, such as showing up at all required court appearances,
regularly arriving at the treatment program on time, attending and fully participating
33. See, e.g., Justice Management Institute, JMI Home Page (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http:l/members.aol.com/jmidenver/> (non-profit organization providing service to courts and
other justice system agencies to improve the overall administration of justice).
34. NAT'L ASS'N OF DRUG CT. PROFS. DRUG CT. STANDARDS COMMITTEE, DEFINING DRUG
COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS, Key Component #6, DCPO Grant No. 96-DC-MX-KOO1 (Jan.
1997).
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in the treatment sessions, cooperating with treatment staff, and submitting to regular
AOD testing."'
The corresponding performance benchmarks reduce these gen-
eral ideas to operating routines. Thus, the first two performance
benchmarks under Key Component 6 state:
1. Treatment providers, the judge, and other program staff maintain frequent, regular
communication to provide timely reporting of progress and noncompliance and to
enable the court to respond immediately. Procedures for reporting noncompliance are
clearly defined in the drug courts operating documents.
2. Responses to compliance and noncompliance are explained verbally and provided in
writing to drug court participants before their orientation. Periodic reminders are
given throughout the treatment process."
These benchmarks can be further particularized as illustrative
suggestions for practice. Thus, the third and fourth performance
benchmarks of Key Component 6 suggests, among other practices,
"[c]eremonies and tokens of progress, including advancement to the
next treatment phase," and "[r]educed supervision" as means of
rewarding progress, as well as "[d]emotion to earlier program phases"
and "[c]onfinement in the courtroom or jury box" to sanction non-
compliance. 7
As of July 1, 1999, nearly 400 drug courts for adult offenders
were operating in the United States, and over 250 were in the plan-
ning stages." Their structure and operations, as reflected in the prin-
ciples and benchmarks, are under continuous review through an
extensive program of local and pooled evaluation. The evaluations are
of two kinds. Process evaluations register the progress of individual
drug courts toward achieving the organizational goals they set for
themselves, for instance, providing timely and rich information on
client behavior or instituting comprehensive and reliable programs of
testing for drug use. Impact evaluations, on the other hand, measure
the effect of drug courts in achieving their overall targets, such as




38. There were 195 adult drug courts that had been in existence for two or more years and
185 drug courts that had become operational more recently. There were another 277 adult drug
courts in the planning stages as well as 88 operational and 79 planned juvenile and family drug
courts. Interview with Jill Beres, Policy Specialist, Drug Court Programs Office, National
Association of Drug Court Professionals (July 1, 1999); see also OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT
ACTIVITY BY STATE (July 1, 1999) (on file with authors).
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The cumulative impact of this attention to process can be seen
in the continual refinement of local procedures that implement
framework principles and performance benchmarks in the light of
present experience. Consider the two-step process developed by the
Brooklyn Treatment Court to implement the key component requiring
client compliance with treatment. The first step is to decide what set
of rules applies to the particular circumstances of each eligible client.39
In consultation with the client, her attorney, the prosecutor, and the
judge, treatment court personnel make an initial assessment and each
client is placed in one of seven "treatment bands" that determine the
frequency of urine testing, program attendance, court appearances,
and case management meetings."° Successful clients satisfy mile-
stones-set at different points in different treatment bands-that
measure their progress through three phases-also having different
boundaries depending on the treatment band-culminating in
graduation."
Given the understanding of addiction as a chronic relapsing
disease, the second step is to determine what happens to clients when
relapse or other rules infractions occur. Because relapse is expected,
only the most egregious violations result in termination. These viola-
tions are arrest for a violent offense or other felony that, in the district
attorney's judgment, warrpants disqualification, and refusal to enter
treatment. For other violations, case managers, or in the event of
repeated or more serious violations, the court, imposes one of a set of
graduated responses. In Table 1, below, we reproduce the responses to
two categories of infractions.
39. There are three absolute criteria for a client to be eligible to have her case heard in
Brooklyn Treatment Court: (1) It must originate within the court's geographical jurisdiction; (2)
the client "cannot have any violent felony conviction or violent charge"; and (3) the treatment
court clinical staff must determine that the client is in fact a substance abuser. Valerie Raine,
Brooklyn Treatment Court Project Director, Revised Memorandum from to Criminal Defense
Practitioners 2 (Sept. 8, 1998) (on file with authors).
40. BROOKLYN TREATMENT COURT, COURT TREATMENT AND SUPERVISION STRUCTURE 2
(revised Sept. 12, 1998) (on file with authors).
41. See id. at 4-5.
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* Dirty or Missed Urine • Increased Case Management Visits and/or
* Missed Appointment Urine tests
* Rule Breaking at Program (not resulting in Mandatory TRP or Step-Up Attendance
termination) Mandatory Workshop Attendance
* Late Arrivals at BTC Detox/Rehab
* Mandatory NAIAA
* Journal Writing
* Loss of Privilege at Program (Contract,
Learning Experiences, etc.)
Infractions Court Imposed Sanctions Mandatory Action
Every "B" infraction will Is' Sanction At Every Sanction
result in an immediate 2 Days Penalty Box Full Band Review
court appearance and court Journal/Letter writing Return to Beginning of
imposed sanction. Essay Phase
• Abscond or Termination Detox/Rehab
From Program with Phase Setback
Voluntary Return to 2nd Sanction
Court • 1 - 7 Days Jail
* Substituted or Tampered • Detox/Rehab
Urine 31d Sanction
* 8 - 14 Days Jail
4t1h Sanction
- 15 - 28 Days Jail
5th Sanction:
• Failure: Alternative Sentence
A similar set of tables sets forth rewards for success-such as jour-
nals, certificates, courtroom applause, opportunities to participate in
the Speaker's Bureau or recreational events, and ultimately, gradua-
42. Id. at 10-11. We omit the similar tables for "A" and "C" infractions. Both "TRP," which
refers to the 'Treatment Readiness Program," and "Step-Up" are educational programs. "NA" is
Narcotics Anonymous. A client sanctioned with the "Penalty Box" must spend several hours
observing the Treatment Court from the jury box. The experience is designed to show the client
that the court will impose jail time for further infractions as well as to provide positive role
models.
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tion resulting in the vacation of the initial guilty plea and the dis-
missal of the case.43
It might be tempting to think of the treatment bands and the
schedules of sanctions as similar to the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines-devices aimed at greatly reducing the discretion of judges in
dealing with individual cases. However, the resemblance is quite
superficial for two reasons. First, as the range of options illustrates,
except in cases of complete failure or success, the treatment court
judge (or in the case of less serious infractions, the case manager) has
considerably more discretion than does a judge working within a
determinate sentencing scheme. The point of the finely tuned bands,
phases, penalties, and rewards is to crystallize the experience of judge,
clinical staff, and treatment providers, so that, to the extent possible,
knowledge about what works can be formalized and rendered accessi-
ble, rather than remaining tacit. Second and more importantly,
whereas the application of sentencing guidelines marks the termina-
tion of a traditional court's involvement in an offender's punishment,
the system of bands, phases, penalties, and rewards serves as the
mechanism by which the treatment court involves itself in the client's
treatment. It is understood, moreover, that this system of categori-
zation may itself require revision from time to time. Thus, for exam-
ple, in mid-1999 the Brooklyn Treatment Court staff were contem-
plating introducing finer gradations in the transition from intensive
residential therapy to outpatient care (band 6 to band 5) because,
under existing criteria, it was difficult for the surprisingly large num-
ber of severely addicted clients to improve their formal position
despite substantial progress within a residential program. '
Treatment courts evaluate outcomes by frequently updated
assessments of the their performance as compared with other
responses to drug offenders as well as their own goals. The most com-
prehensive available study, undertaken by Steven Belenko of the
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia
University, is characteristically a review of assessments of drug court
courts that have already assessed themselves within their brief exis-
tence. 5 Belenko's 1998 study updates a 1997 United States General
Accounting Office ("GAO") report that found that there were insuffi-
cient data to reach a definitive conclusion as to whether drug courts
43. See id. at 12-17.
44. Interview with Alesia Donner, Clinical Director, Brooklyn Treatment Court (July 7,
1999).
45. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST.
REV. 1, 1 (1998) (reviewing "30 evaluations pertaining to 24 drug courts across the nation").
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reduce recidivism and relapse.46 Belenko considered a wider range of
published and unpublished assessments than the GAO study." His
findings were as follows:
[1] Despite the different drug court statutes, jurisdictional differences, methods used by
evaluators and the limitations of some data, a number of consistent findings emerge
from available drug court evaluations.
[2] Retention rates for drug courts are much greater than the retention rates typically
observed for criminal justice offenders specifically, and treatment clients in general.
[3] Although it is generally thought that drug courts target "first-time offenders" many
drug court participants have substantial criminal histories and many years of
substance abuse.
[4] Drug courts provide closer, more comprehensive supervision and much more
frequent drug testing and monitoring during the program than other forms of
community supervision.
[5] Drug courts generate savings, at least in the short term, from reduced jail/prison
use, reduced criminality and lower criminal justice costs.
[6] Drug use is substantially reduced while offenders are participating in drug court.
[7] Criminal behavior is substantially reduced while the offenders are participating in
drug court.
[8 Based on more limited data and to a lesser but still significant extent, drug courts
reduce recidivism for participants after they leave the program.
48
Moreover, some drug courts that did not show initial success have
improved their performance markedly. 9
46. See id. at 7 (updating the GAO study using new evaluations); GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 23, at 7, GAO/GGD-97-106 (1997) ("GAO . . . could not draw any firm
conclusions on the overall impact of drug court programs.").
47. See Belenko, supra note 45, at 8-9 (considering 30 evaluations on 24 drug courts, some
of which were not subject to peer review).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 8.
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Other assessments of treatment courts' efficacy have ranged
from enthusiastic appraisals of specific programs' to cautious calls for
more data. Thus, Belenko notes that future studies should collect
more post-program data, track outcomes other than re-arrest, quantify
effects of specific variations in program design, and develop more
informative comparisons." These valid criticisms, along with self-
reflection, have inspired a national impact evaluation currently being
conducted by the National Institute of Justice." Applicants for federal
enhancement grants must be able to track the kind of detailed data
necessary for sophisticated outcome (as well as process) measures.'
Consequently, new treatment courts are being designed, and existing
treatment courts are being re-designed, with the built-in capacity to
produce the outcome measures that will enable evaluation of their
performance.
This portrait of treatment courts reveals them to be experimen-
talist local institutions within an experimentalist national framework.
However, as we explain in Part III, important steps remain to be
taken before it can be said that the treatment courts have fully ex-
ploited the potential of information exchange and pooling as a means
of experimentalist learning and regulation. Before describing the
missing elements, however, we pause to respond to the objection that
treatment courts are not, even in prospect, breaking new ground.
50. For example, of the 4,500 offenders ordered into treatment by the Miami treatment
court between 1989 and 1993, by the end of that period "two-thirds had remained in treatment
(1,270) or graduated (1,700). Among graduates, the rearrest rate one year later was less than 3
percent, compared to 30 percent for similar drug offenders who did not go through drug court."
Hora, supra note 2, at 456 (citing DRUG STRATEGIES, CUTTING CRIME: DRUG COURTS IN AcTION 6
(1997)). Like results have been observed elsewhere as well. See Michelle Shaw & Kenneth
Robinson, Reports on Recent Drug Court Research, 2 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 107, 107 (1999)
(reporting results of five new studies); see also The White House, Fact Sheet: Drug Treatment in
the Criminal Justice System-Alternatives to Treatment (visited Aug. 1998) <http://www.
whitehouse-drugpolicy.gov/drugfactltreatfactltreat7.html> (noting the results of studies of
treatment courts in Santa Clara, California and Washington, D.C., which showed, respectively,
reductions in addiction and in the monetary costs to the criminal justice system).
51. See Belenko, supra note 45, at 33-36 (explaining that future studies should close the
gaps "in our knowledge about drug courts").
52. See Office of Justice Programs, Drug Court Grant Program Fiscal Year 1999 Program
Guidelines and Application Kit, supra note 31, at 39 (stating that "additional evaluations are
needed to validate the usefulness of drug courts").
53. See id. at 37 (recipients must "demonstrate their capability to ensure adequate program
management through monitoring, tracking, and process assessment").
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II. ARE DRUG TREATMENT COURTS NOVEL?
The case for seeing treatment courts as experimentalist insti-
tutions is straightforward. In addition to the points discussed above,
one might note how the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney take
on unaccustomed roles in treatment court.' Prosecutors and defense
attorneys accustomed to coming together only to strike bargains at
arm's length come to see one another as partners in the delivery of a
service. The role transformation of the judge is even more dramatic. It
is truly remarkable to witness a judge standing and applauding for a
confessed criminal, or sincerely inquiring into how he is faring in
treatment or in a job-all the while demonstrating a genuine famili-
arity with the lives of the people before her. (During one session we
observed, Brooklyn Treatment Court Judge Ferdinand asked a client
why his grandmother was not in the courtroom on that occasion.) Nor
does the judge merely take on the roles of social worker, cheerleader,
and parental authority figure. She also sheds the role of judge, if
judging is understood as the articulation of legal principle or the
application of law to fact. The treatment court judge adjudicates no
disputed issues-not even as to sentencing. With each client's com-
plete criminal and treatment record appearing on the judge's com-
puter monitor, there are no contests to resolve-just inquiries to pose
to clients, attorneys, and court staff.
Nevertheless, it is possible to describe treatment courts in
quite different terms. Thus, we now contrast our initial sketch of
treatment courts as experimentalist institutions with two alternative
explanations. The first sees treatment courts as, at best, a transient
phase in the life cycle of bureaucratic institutions condemned con-
stantly to alter the balance they strike between efficacy and account-
ability precisely because they cannot, as a matter of principle, achieve
a stable reconciliation of the two. The second explanation entertains
the possibility of such a reconciliation, but suggests (although it does
not compel) an account of this achievement that rests more on the
revivification of traditional forms of professional autonomy than on
the emergence of novel institutions.
54. See Hora, supra note 2, at 468-69, 476-80, 516-26 (describing the orientation, structure,
and procedure of drug treatment courts); Boldt, supra note 23, at 1246-68 (describing the
different roles of court officers in rehabilitation courts); Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering For a New
Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (noting the differences between ordinary courts and
rehabilitation courts); McColl, supra note 20, at 512-15 (outlining the differences between
traditional courts and drug courts); Developments in the Law: Alternatives to Incarceration for
Drug-Abusing Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1917-19 (1998) (discussing treatment
alternatives for drug-abusing offenders).
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The view of the treatment courts as a transitory and cyclical
phenomenon is rooted in the Weberian idea of hierarchy or bureauc-
racy as an instrument of the sovereign will, and in the criticism of that
form of organization which has become a staple of modern sociology
and economics. In the Weberian ideal, the sovereign selects the goals
of the organization and appoints officials who partition tasks in a way
calculated to achieve them. The subdivision of tasks into a hier-
archical set of meshed routines allows for the coordination of complex
activities without regard to idiosyncrasies of personality, and simul-
taneously allows superiors to review the decisions of subordinates
closely enough to deter or detect abuses of authority. Thus, the same
rules that make the hierarchy effective make it accountable.'
The criticism of the Weberian model starts with the idea,
alluded to above, that it is generally impossible to specify means and
ends with the exactitude that the ideal of the effective and accountable
bureaucracy supposes. The reason, again very generally, is that the
determination of ends will depend on evolving experience of the effi-
cacy of the means used to achieve them, and vice versa: the knowledge
gained in collecting certain kinds of taxes or building certain kinds of
cars will shape ideas of what kinds of taxes to collect and cars to build.
Changes in goals will then suggest further changes in the means, and
yet another reevaluation of purposes. But giving subordinates freedom
to modify means and ends on the basis of this kind of reciprocating
reevaluation plainly opens the door to abuse. Invited to exercise their
discretion, the subordinates may prefer policies that advance their
own self interest (perhaps by favoring the expansion of the part of the
bureaucracy or firm most hospitable to their own career interests over
the expansion of the departments best suited to the new task). Self-
interested manipulations will be hard to detect precisely because the
only officials with the knowledge of local detail sufficient to review the
suspect choices will be those whose expertise was used to motivate
them in the first place.
Ideal and criticism define an antinomy: hierarchy is an
instrument of complex coordination that cannot be accomplished
through the market, but it is also an obstacle to it. Much of the con-
temporary economics and sociology of organizations accepts this
antinomy as definitive, and focuses correspondingly on ways of miti-
55. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIETY 956-73
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans. 1968) (describing the
accountability of hierarchical structures). We elaborate the critique of the Weberian view of
bureaucracy-as-efficient below. For a representative critique based on bureaucracy's tendency to
oppress, see MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1972).
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gating, but not resolving it. Thus an influential theory of the firm,
associated with the name of Chester Barnard, sees the "function of the
executive" precisely in the harmonization, through managerial discre-
tion, of the purposes of the formal organization defined by rules and
the purposes of the informal groups that actually comprise the official
hierarchy.' Good managers find ways to enlist the informal structure
in the official cause, not least by redefining the latter to reflect
concerns of the former. After long excursions through principal-agent
and game theory, economists concerned with industrial organization-
the problems of the boundaries and internal organization of the firm-
are arriving at similar conclusions.'
In the setting of public, as opposed to private, organizations,
the antinomy of hierarchy is often supposed to lead to even less satis-
factory results. In the case of firms, there is, in theory at least, an
owner-shareholders or proprietor-who, acting under the pressure of
competition, has the motive and capacity to intervene when the
organization begins manifestly to favor its own purposes over the
officially declared purposes. In the case of public institutions, the
citizen owners are, again in theory, too removed from responsibility to
intervene in the case of bad performance. Bad performance is,
moreover, hard to detect because given exclusive jurisdiction in their
own domains, public institutions rarely have to compare the results of
their operations with the results obtained by "competitors" in other
locales or fields.
Hence, as applied to public institutions, the antinomy of hier-
archy is thought to lead not to a continuous managerialist balancing of
efficiency and accountability, but rather to a fitful oscillation between
institutional forms that in effect sacrifice the one for the other. Under
the pressure of a political reaction against the consequences,
arrangements are eventually reversed in favor of an equal but oppo-
site imbalance, which endures until a contrary political reaction starts
the cycle over again.
The history of policing in the United States in recent decades is
a well-rehearsed example of such a cycle. It is presumably prudent for
the police to inquire into suspicious behavior before it eventuates in
crime. But it is notoriously difficult to frame general rules limiting the
56. For an introduction, see generally ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO
THE PRESENT AND BEYOND (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) (describing harmony between formal
group purposes and informal group purposes).
57. See George P. Baker et. al., Informal Authority in Organizations, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG.




police exercise of discretion in the identification of suspects by defin-
ing just which behavior is suspicious. At the limit, any deviation from
the norms of good conduct held by a local community can appear
suspicious to members of that community or its law-enforcement
agents. Broad definitions favor efficacy over accountability, narrow
ones do the reverse. Thus in the period before the civil rights move-
ment, when minority communities were politically enfeebled, majority
communities often preferred the first solution-local vagrancy ordi-
nances allowed police forces to determine for themselves whom to
count as a deviant and therefore a suspect "outsider," and to force
"offenders" out of the community. In the wake of the civil rights
movement, courts came to see the discretion granted by such ordi-
nances as providing an unacceptable cover for discrimination against
minorities, and the local regulations were declared unconstitutional.58
In the 1970s and 1980s, the old imbalance was replaced by
methods of policing that strictly limited the conditions under which
officers could challenge citizens not actively engaged in crime. But the
resulting sacrifice of efficacy to accountability in turn produced a
(counter) counter-reaction-community policing. In part this "new"
approach consists of a return to the old methods of just the sort that
the cyclical view would lead us to expect-for example the police use of
loopholes in constitutional doctrine to harass suspect populations
driving on the roads,59 paused at highway bus stops,' or merely loi-
tering.' And these practices, in turn, provoke calls for new limits on
58. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, And The New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 595-608 (1997) (discussing the
legal transformation and its historical context). For a discussion of the pervasive role of race in
the American criminal justice system, see generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).
59. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the "stop and frisk" of a suspect on foot on the basis of a "reasonable suspicion" of dangerous
criminality. This standard, which is lower than the probable cause required for a full-blown
search or arrest, has since been extended to other contexts, such as automobile stops. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that a "reasonable suspicion" standard
applies to automobile stops); see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1693-94 (1998) (arguing that the Court
improperly extended Terry to cases in which there was no suspicion that the person to be stopped
was about to commit a violent or otherwise serious crime).
60. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (holding that police may question a bus
passenger without violating the Fourth Amendment).
61. The Court's recent decision in City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999),
reaffirms earlier limits placed on vagrancy laws, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361
(1983) (holding that anti-loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (holding that anti-vagrancy statute was unconstitutionally
vague), but the stop-and-frisk authority permits considerable circumvention of those limits. See,
e.g., Scott E. Sundby, An Ode To Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and
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the new discretion-as in protests against the "profiling" that makes
suspects of whole populations defined by little more than skin color,
dress, and age."2
Nevertheless, in selected forms of community policing, some of
the new methods can be seen as an instance of an experimentalism
that escapes the Weberian tradeoff. Seen that way, they are a counter-
example to the cyclical view,' as, we argue below, are drug courts.
Variants of the cyclical view can also be used to account for the
extension of government services in uncertain environments. The
legislative and administrative rule-making processes are typically too
slow, the argument goes, to allow for timely responses to the eruption
of new problems such as homelessness or HIV infection.' In these
circumstances, the state has little recourse but to associate itself with
non-government or voluntary organizations ('NGOs") rooted in the
concerned communities, in the provision of the necessary services.
Operating in the penumbra of government authority, often dispersing
public monies, yet operating by rules of their own devising, and
responsible, if at all, to the nascent communities from which they
themselves emerge, the NGOs represent the clearest possible expres-
sion of preference for efficacy over accountability. In time, the argu-
ment continues, the NGOs will abuse their discretion. Perhaps they
will turn away citizens who are entitled to services, but are not
unambiguously part of the affected community, or perhaps they will
simply lose track of government funds. Government agencies, mean-
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1133, 1135-38 (1998) (describing the flexibility the
reasonableness standard allows).
62. In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the fact
that the police selected a suspect based on a "drug courier profile" did not negate the existence of
the reasonable suspicion necessary for a stop. Civil libertarians have long argued, however, that
the use of such profiles often provides cover for, among other things, racial discrimination, see
generally David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997), a charge that was
recently confirmed in New Jersey. See Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al.
63. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 3, at 327-32; Archon Fung, Street Level Democracy: A
Theory of Popular Pragmatic Deliberation and Its Practice in Chicago School Governance and
Community Policing, 1988-97, ch. 5, at 9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation manuscript, M.I.T,
Department of Political Science, 1999) (on file with authors). For a more skeptical view of
democratic participation in community policing beat meetings in Chicago and more generally,
see WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING: CHICAGO STYLE (1997);
Wesley G. Skogan, The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents, in THE
CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 180 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994) ('There are ample
examples of failed experiments and cities where the concept has gone awry.').
64. Cf. Matthew McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442
(1989) (describing problems with rale-making).
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while, will acquire passing familiarity with the new problems and may
be tempted to provide the requisite services themselves. As a condition
of continued cooperation with the state, the NGOs will have to submit
to the very straightjacket of rules that made the original bureaucra-
cies incapable of responding to the new problem in the first place.
When the next problem erupts, the cycle starts again. 5
A final and particularly pertinent example of the cyclical ex-
planation at work concerns the criminal justice system generally, and
particularly the vicissitudes of courts for juvenile offenders. The story
begins with the Progressives in the early decades of this century.
Reformers were convinced that the sentences and other rules of crimi-
nal justice applied to adults would, if applied equally to juveniles,
destroy whatever possibilities for rehabilitation the latter might
otherwise have. The remedy was the creation of a distinct tribunal,
the juvenile court, explicitly authorized to deviate from the adult
model whenever the deviation would contribute directly to, or clear
the space for, therapeutic efforts aimed at rehabilitation.' In time this
system came to be seen as a morass in which judges and social work-
ers have undue discretion in determining the fate of juvenile offend-
ers6 -- simultaneously, if paradoxically, depriving them of their rights
as (adult) defendants-while depriving society of the consistent pro-
tection of the law against potentially dangerous, if youthful crimi-
nals.68 These costs seldom appear to be offset by gains in rehabili-
tation. No wonder that the system is seen as a failure, and that
65. See generally STEVEN R. SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE
WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING (1993) (describing the problems with governmental
involvement with NGOs).
66. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(2d ed. 1977) (describing the origins of the juvenile court); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID
PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978) (describing the juvenile court
experience); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1098 (1991) (noting the
distinction between juveniles and adults).
67. In addition to the discretion exercised by juvenile court judges, the determination
whether to try a particular juvenile as an adult is often arbitrary-either because it is dictated
by rigid statutory criteria or because it is not. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard
Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267, 268 (1991) (preferring discretion as the lesser evil).
68. Arguments that juvenile courts "coddle" offenders are familiar from public discourse.
For a statement of the view that juvenile courts neglect juvenile defendants' need for adversarial
representation, see Ainsworth, supra note 66, passim. For an effort to connect the drug court
movement to this debate, see Boldt, supra note 54, at 1269-86. For an interesting counterview
that emphasizes a different conception of the defense attorney's role, see Katherine H. Federle,
The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the
Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1656 (1996).
20001 857
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
further reform is likely to go in the direction of reincorporating juve-
nile offenders into the adult system."'
In the light of these experiences, and the view of the cyclical
oscillation between efficacy and accountability in general, the pros-
pects for treatment courts appear bright in the near term, and dim for
the long run. Thus, the current enthusiasm for, and rapid diffusion of,
treatment courts recalls the salad days of the juvenile system, or the
successful, freewheeling period of the initial provision of services to
the homeless and the HIV-infected population by NGOs. But just wait,
this reading of the history admonishes. In time the protests against
the abuse of discretion will mount, and so outweigh any gains in effi-
cacy that the public will eventually insist on a return to accountability
by way of the reimposition of bureaucratic methods and fixed (harsh)
penalties.
This pessimism rests, we think, on a false dichotomy between
accountable acts, so closely aligned with the bright-line rules author-
izing them that there can be no question of their legitimacy, and dis-
cretionary acts so dependent on the particular contexts of the situa-
tion in which they were performed that there can be no hope of
legitimizing them. This distinction-a legacy of the old, stalled conflict
between the Weberian ideal of bureaucracy and its critics-overlooks
the existence of a category of knowledge which does not admit of
summary as a general rule for all cases, yet is a much more productive
guide to behavior and reform than a mere collection of nearly ineffable
expressions of local experience. The pooled experience of actors under-
taking similar activities and reporting on their intentions and prog-
ress is an example of just such knowledge. Taken together, the experi-
ences define a range of possibilities that permit fine-grained
distinctions among, on the one hand, irresponsible acts (that duplicate
efforts that have repeatedly failed) and caprice (where measures are
undertaken with scant attention to what the record suggests about the
chances of success), and on the other hand, genuine experiments
(where analysis of previous failures suggests the possibility of a new
demarche).
Insofar as treatment courts and other experimentalist institu-
tions rely on such pooled information for self reform, they escape the
tradeoff between efficacy and accountability, becoming more effective
precisely by improving the quality of the very information that also
69. See, e.g., H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999) (passed by House of Representatives, June 20,
1999) (giving the power to try a juvenile as an adult to prosecutors rather than judges and
stiffening p~nalties for juveniles convicted of firearms, explosives, and drug crimes).
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makes them more accountable. More generally, in anticipating the
possibilities that experiments growing out of the choice of means can
lead to a redefinition of ends, experimentalist organizations make a
constitutive principle of-and thereby subject to public discussion and
control-the dynamics of change that Weberians and their critics
regarded as the dark, disruptive secret of formal coordination. In this
sense, the dedication noted above of drug courts to documenting their
processes and to defining and disseminating best practices is best
understood not as an effort to write a definitive rulebook but rather as
a method of using self-explication as a prod to continuing self exami-
nation and revision. We will see below how this process can be applied
more fully than it currently is to the institutions that drug courts
monitor."
This discussion of the formally communicable and inherently
inter-disciplinary or open character of the pooled experience on which
treatment courts and other experimentalist institutions depend, helps
us, finally, set these organizations in relation to, and distinguish them
from related entities-the professions. Our purpose here goes beyond
analytic refinement. The construction of treatment courts has gone
hand in hand with the growth of the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals, whose title suggests that the architects of the
new system legitimate their efforts as an expression of a common
professional commitment, but it is a commitment to a novel, impre-
cisely defined and perhaps anomalous profession.YAn indication of the
similarities and differences between experimentalism and profes-
sionalism will further resolve the contours of the emerging institution.
First the similarities. Like experimentalist organizations, and
unlike bureaucracies, the professions rely on decentralized decision
making. Schooled in the background knowledge of the profession (e.g.,
legal, medical, or engineering), and practiced in its application
through the resolution of countless concrete cases, professionals, like
craft workers, are defined by their ability to bring the principles em-
bodied in certain general problem-solving techniques to bear in par-
ticular contexts. In doing this they may consult with colleagues; but to
defer to expert superiors is to jeopardize their claim to profession-
alism. Furthermore, again like experimentalist organizations and
unlike bureaucracies, professionalism acknowledges the inter-pene-
tration of means and ends. "Clinical" evidence, the experience derived
70. See infra Part IH.A (discussing "relapse reports").
71. See Nat' Ass'n of Drug Ct. (visited May 6, 1999) <http://www.drugcourt.org/home.cfm>
(describing the mission of the organization).
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from the treatment of disease in living patients, can come to redefine
the understanding of the pathology of the disease itself.
But now we come to two closely related differences. First, the
decentralized decisionmaking within professions occurs inside rela-
tively closed "jurisdictional" boundaries. The same corpus of scientific
understanding and practical problem-solving skills that gives profes-
sionals their autonomy marks the profession as a whole off from other,
even closely neighboring disciplines and occupations. These distinc-
tions are reinforced by the formal mechanisms of self governance
including, especially, certification of professional training and licens-
ing of practitioners by which the professions connect control over
expertise to control over the labor markets relevant to their economic
situation. Cooperation among professions, like cooperation among
crafts, is consequently always fragile. Hence, the notion of "treatment
court professionals" is aspirational if not self-contradictory because it
suggests the possibility of a meta-profession whose members are
somehow able to overcome the barriers that have thus far separated
them by declaring adherence to a common, as yet unfinished institu-
tion, the drug court itself. In fact, in order to become a reliable basis
for a profession, the treatment court would have to leap past the
experiments by which it is currently defining itself, and suppose a
fixity of purpose and boundaries which would belie the openness of its
exploratory activities.72
Experimentalist institutions, in contrast, use constant explora-
tion of their relation, at the boundary, with other institutions, as one
means among others, of continually re-interpreting core elements of
their task. Understood this way, the collaboration between the crimi-
nal justice system and the world of addiction treatment is taking place
through the treatment courts and has already begun to transform
both. Further, as we will see below in the discussion of aftercare, there
is every reason to think that associations with other areas of profes-
sional activity will result in further transformations of all those
concerned.
72. The NADCP's own literature recognizes that it is more aptly described as an
organization that includes members of a variety of professions, rather than a professional
organization in the conventional sense:
The National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) is the principal
organization of professionals involved in the development and implementation of
treatment-oriented Drug Courts. Organized in 1994, its members include over 3000
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, treatment providers and rehabilitation experts,
law enforcement and corrections personnel, educators, researchers, and community
leaders.
NADCP, NADCP Backgrounder (visited May 6, 1999) <http://www.drugcourt.org/backgrnd.cfm>.
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The second difference between professionalism and experimen-
talism goes to the character of the pooled expertise that results from
decentralized decisionmaking and the relation of this knowledge to the
organizational relation between means and ends. Precisely because
professions tend to operate within relatively narrow boundaries,
much, indeed most clinical knowledge is transmitted informally (if at
all) through direct participation in common projects or anecdote. Put
another way, this knowledge is regarded as tacit in the sense that it
resists any freestanding articulation. This has been particularly true
in the case of professions such as law and social work where causal
models can seldom be brought to bear on actual problems, and where
contextualized decisionmaking on the basis of accumulated experience
is at a premium. Thus, it has been a commonplace for nearly a century
that law school training leaves graduates largely unprepared for the
actual practice of law; and yet the profession's response is to leave
things as they are rather than to do what is, from the conventional
professional perspective impossible-capture the seemingly inevitably
tacit principles of practice. Nor does the emergence of clinical legal
education (yet) challenge this view. On the contrary, most people in
the legal academy still view the clinical practice of law as a means of
inducting students into the professional mysteries, 3 and practicing
professionals are only just beginning to look to law school clinics as
the Archimedean point from which to transform legal education."
In contrast with knowledge as understood in the traditional
model of the professions, the knowledge generated by experimentalist
institutions is conceived from the start as the vehicle for comparisons
with those undertaking like activities or for coordination with those
undertaking complementary ones. It is therefore formalized in the
limited but crucial sense of being fully enough specified and transmis-
sible to provoke discussion with parties that did not immediately
participate in its generation. However far such knowledge may be
from science understood as a body of foundational or even very deeply
73. Teachers of clinical law courses, unlike clinicians in many other professions, have
usually been disposed to accept their activities as essentially pedagogic (albeit providing a more
practical, and thus, it is argued, more effective introduction to the legal world), as opposed to
investigatory (uncovering in practice possibilities neglected in theory). Some of the most
reflective legal clinicians view the transformative role of clinical legal education as one of putting
into effective practice critical theories of law developed in academic debate. See, e.g., Jane M.
Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990, 2045-47 (1995)
(describing the place of clinical training in critical movements).
74. For a suggestion along these lines, see generally A.B.A. SEC. ON LEG. EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (commonly known as "The MacCrate Report") (1992).
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entrenched basic principles, it is also sufficiently far from tacitness as
to allow for forms of accountability that keep the activity of particular
groups of experts open to challenge from groups with other specialties
and the lay public alike. In this sense, the open boundaries of experi-
mentalist institutions and the articulability of the knowledge they
generate can be thought of as a radicalization of the coordinated deci-
sionmaking expertise which gives professions the suppleness they
enjoy with respect to bureaucracy.75
Consider two examples of changes in the helping professions-
one that illustrates collaboration across areas of expertise, and a
second illustrating a new emphasis on explicating previously tacit
forms of knowledge. Transformations currently taking place within
social work, the profession most closely associated with drug treat-
ment, illustrate the first phenomenon. In the old model, the aspiring
social worker studies a body of knowledge-in this case what is known
about the human life cycle.' In the new model, prospective counselors
and others learn how to work with and learn from those engaged in a
wide range of complementary activities. Effective delivery of social
services related to a problem like substance abuse often requires the
provision of mental health, housing, vocational training, and child
welfare services, to name just a few. Single-mandate government
agencies have difficulty meeting such diverse needs. Service integra-
tion has long been understood to be the solution to this difficulty.
However, where earlier efforts at service integration by state and local
governments emphasized agency reorganizations and inter-agency
coordination, the most recent efforts have focused on intra-agency
coordination and street-level changes.7 As in the drug courts, the basic
strategy is -to delegate responsibility for service provision to local
bodies, with a central body performing the tasks of pooling and moni-
toring. 8 Because such reforms demand a high degree of cross-discipli-
75. This is not to say that experimentalism should be conceived as in any way an outgrowth
of professionalism, for the attitudes and procedures it requires can be found outside the
professions. Consider technicians. Despite low status and low pay relative to professionals, the
demands of the job lead technicians to "value independent thinking, flexibility, and the other
attributes of a scientist." Stephen R. Barley & Beth A. Bechky, In the Backrooms of Science-
The Work of Technicians in Science Labs, 21 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 85, 97 (1994). Much more
than mere helpmates of professionals, technicians "experience their work largely as the
management of trouble." Id. at 91.
76. For the classic text on this subject, see generally CHARLOTTE TOWLE, COMMON HUMAN
NEEDS (rev. ed. 1987).
77. See Jane Waldfogel, The New Wave of Service Integration, 71 SOC. SERVICE REV. 463,
470 (1997) (describing Maryland's experience).
78. See id. at 471-72.
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nary collaboration by caseworkers, they create pressure to redefine
professional boundaries.79
As an example of the possibility of professional skills that need
not be tacit, consider changes beginning to take place in primary and
secondary school teaching. Much like law schools, schools of education
have long been criticized for providing credentials but scant practical
knowledge of the skills needed to succeed in practice (other than those
actually acquired by student-teaching or like experiences). Good
teachers, in the traditional view, become that way through a combina-
tion of natural charisma and on-the-job training. From this vantage
point, the opposition of teachers' professional organizations to legisla-
tive mandates that teachers be rewarded based on student perform-
ance is not mere narrow self-interest, but an insistence that effective
teaching can only be shown to be such in real time. Standardized
tests, indeed, any outcome measures, are hopelessly reductionist.
What teachers need most, on this view, is to be released from bureau-
cratic trammels.'
An alternative conception, that aims not at reviving traditional
professionalism but at changing its nature, focuses on making more
accessible to debate, and thereby corrigible, the principles of good
teaching. The focus here is on decomposing broad skills like mathe-
matical ability into a set of complex but more limited sub-tasks, such
as formulating problems, identifying potentially relevant mathemati-
cal structures, selecting among them, and manipulating the formal-
isms.8' This process permits teachers, pupils, and administrators to
see precisely where problems arise. For example, instead of saying
that a student or teacher is bad in, respectively, understanding or
teaching mathematics, it becomes possible to identify more precisely
the source of the difficulty, and thus to address it. We will see below
that this kind of parsing of a complex activity into sub-components
that allows for a more precise identification of difficulties encountered
79. See id. at 470.
80. Here is a characteristic statement of the traditional position:
Even in the hands of sincere allies of children, equity, and public education, the current
push for far greater standardization than we've ever previously attempted is
fundamentally misguided. It will not help to develop young minds, contribute to a robust
democratic life, or aid the most vulnerable of our fellow citizens. By shifting the locus of
authority to outside bodies, it undermines the capacity of schools to instruct by example
in the qualities of mind that schools in a democracy should be fostering ....
Deborah Meier, Educating a Democracy: Standards and the Future of Public Education, 24
BOSTON REV. 4, 4 (1999/2000).
81. See RICHARD J. MURNANE & FRANK LEVY, TEACHING THE NEW BASIC SKILLS:
PRINCIPLES FOR EDUCATING CHILDREN TO THRIVE IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 164-200 (1996)
(discussing the merits of problem-solving through defining a clear goal and then regularly
measuring progress towards that goal).
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by particular individuals has a close analogue in some of the instru-
ments in substance abuse treatment that decompose the circum-
stances likely to trigger relapse into a set of cues for dangerous situa-
tions. For present purposes, we note the connection between, on the
one hand, decomposition of broadly defined skills, and on the other,
measures of educational outcome. In the newer model, students are
evaluated on their ability to master each component of various portfo-
lios of skills, and in the process of refining their collegial judgments
about performance in these related areas, teachers come to formulate
with increasingly greater precision what constitutes good teaching and
successful learning. By linking learning what needs to be taught and
how effectively to teach it to the monitoring of both, the teachers both
improve their performance and make what they and their pupils do
amenable to more precise evaluation.' The concept of professional
development for teachers accordingly changes from teachers' mastery
of new subjects as a form of continuing education to collaborative
exploratioi of the ways to parse new material into constituent skills
and evaluate the mastery of those skills by students.'
The foregoing sketches of recent developments in social work
and education provide the outline of a new conception of a profession,
consisting of a loosely defined subject matter, a set of core skills, gen-
eralized partnering disciplines, and a commitment to making
reasonably explicit (as opposed to tacit) the corrigible principles that
enable practitioners to succeed. The very slipperiness of the resulting
disciplinary boundaries reveals how starkly such an approach con-
trasts with the traditional conception of a profession.'
82. See infra note 89 (discussing cues).
83.. Hilda Borko et al., Professional Development: A Key to Kentucky's Reform Effort (CSE
Technical Report 512) (Cresst/University of Colorado at Boulder) (Nov. 1999).
84. For a cautiously optimistic discussion of the role of such new forms of professional
development in standards-based school reform, see Richard J. Murnane, The Case for Standards,
24 BOSTON REV. 15, 15 (1999/2000) ("Historically, most professional development funds have
paid for one-day workshops that do not affect how teachers teach and students learn. A key
element of any reform should be focusing professional development on helping teachers to teach
critical skills more effectively.'). For an in-depth view of how this new form of professional
development can link team teaching of portfolio skills at the school level to ongoing revision of
broad standard tests, see generally Borko et al., supra note 83.
85. For efforts to come to grips with these changes (as of the mid-1990s) while retaining the
traditional core conception of a profession as relatively closed and defined by its subject matter
and specific skills set, see the essays collected in NEW RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ORGANIZED
PROFESSIONS (Robin Fincham, ed. 1996). The standard text in the field defines professions as
"exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases."
ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 8
(1988). Abbott emphasizes that the internal structure and development of professions depends
on their relations with other professions and divisions of labor, see id., passim, a point as likely to
be true of the new, more fluid conception of professions we propose as of the older model.
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Finally, although we do not pursue the point here, a similar
blurring of roles has been occurring in the private sector outside of the
helping professions. In private firms, the distinction between man-
agers who conceive and workers who execute is breaking down. Teams
emerge in which members have responsibility for setting goals and
choosing the means for executing them. This same process breaks
down the distinctions between separate disciplines, as teams combine
expertise, as and when the pursuit of changing goals requires that
they do so. Indeed, much of the language of benchmarking, collabora-
tive program design, and teamwork that we see in the drug courts is
drawn from experience in the corporate sector.' The spread of these
new methods internationally and across different sectors of the econ-
omy and between the economy as a whole and the public sector sug-
gests their broad potential as instruments for problem solving under
conditions of complexity. This potential in turn gives added force to
our claim that the forms of collaboration typical of treatment courts
are institutional novelties and not a return to a temporarily
suppressed tradition.
III. DANGERS AND RESPONSES
The exposition thus far makes plausible the claim that treat-
ment courts have begun to incorporate new principles of collaboration
that circumvent the conventional tradeoff between flexibility and
accountability. In this Part, we take account of two sorts of criticisms.
First we address the concerns of those who take drug courts as they
are to be a substantial improvement over the previous response of the
criminal justice system to the problem of addiction, but think that
applying their own principles more consistently and rigorously than
they do, drug courts could be made substantially better. Then we
address the concerns of some civil libertarians who believe that drug
courts are inherently a menace to the rights of citizens against the
state, and that making them better at what they do will only make
them more menacing to liberty.
A. Supplying Missing Pieces
Viewed in the light of their own ambitions and animating
principles, a first limit to the drug courts' performance is their scant
monitoring of treatment providers. Moreover, evaluations of drug
86. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 292-314.
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courts seldom ask whether they are systematically evaluating treat-
ment providers. Drug court officials with whom we spoke were atten-
tive to the problem, but few had concrete ideas about how to solve it,
beyond, for example, the formation of advisory councils where court
personnel and treatment providers periodically meet to exchange
ideas.'
It might seem that this problem is intractable given the diver-
sity of the treatment providers that are likely to be active in any large
jurisdiction. For example, the Brooklyn Treatment Court places
clients in well over a hundred distinct facilities in the metropolitan
New York area.8 However, if national entities are capable of evalu-
ating hundreds of different drug courts operating under diverse
circumstances, it should be possible for drug courts themselves to
develop provisional measures of treatment providers' effectiveness,
along with mechanisms for continual refinement of the measures
themselves.
One candidate measure is a natural extension of data collection
that treatment courts already undertake. In exchange for receiving
mandated clients, treatment providers must supply the court with
regular and detailed reports on each client. These reports have great
potential to improve treatment itself. "For years, drug abuse research-
ers have known that when addicts are exposed to drug-related cues,
such as the sight of drug paraphernalia or even a drug-using compan-
ion, these stimuli can spark powerful drug craving."'" Counselors
emphasize to clients the importance of identifying circumstances that
present risks of relapse, and developing strategies to avoid using
drugs when these circumstances arise.' In this sense, treatment
87. Interview with Alesia Donner, Clinical Director, Brooklyn Treatment Court (July 7,
1999).
88. See Brooklyn Treatment Court Network of Treatment and Social Service Providers 19
(Aug. 5, 1998) (listing 132 providers) (on file with author).
89. Neil Swan, NIDA Brain Imaging Research Links Cue-Induced Craving to Structures
Involved in Memory (visited July 2, 1999) <http://165.112.78.61/NIDANotesINNVolllN5/-
CueInd.html>; see also Brian Carlson, Brain Imaging: Showing Drug Craving Links to Memory
Centers, 13 ADVANCED IMAGING, No. 10 (Oct. 1, 1998); Joanna S. Fowler & Nora D. Volkow, PET
Imaging Studies in Drug Abuse, 36 J. OF TOXICOLOGY: CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 168 (Apr. 1, 1998)
(noting that "neuro-chemical changes in the brains of addicted individuals may underlie the
inability to control impulses to take the drug and may explain relapse").
90. See Kathleen M. Carroll, A Cognitive-Behavioral Approach: Treating Cocaine Addiction,
in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NIH Pub. No. 98-4308, at 15-17 (1998) (listing the
kinds of questions therapists should ask in helping each client assess his or her risk factors)
(report available at National Inst. on Drub Abuse, Therapy Manuals for Drug Addicts (visited
May 7, 1999) <http://www.nida.nih.gov/TXManuals/CBT/CBT1.html>); Alan J. Budney &
Stephen T. Higgins, A Community Reinforcement Plus Vouchers Approach: Treating Cocaine
Addiction, NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NIH Pub. No. 98-4309, at 55 (1998) ("[I]f cocaine use
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providers' reports to the court may be understood as "relapse reports"
that serve a dual role: they are therapeutic devices and also instru-
ments of institutional reform. From one viewpoint, this report is a
customized treatment plan, elaborated by the client in collaboration
with his counselor. Each relapse indicates gaps in their joint knowl-
edge of the patient's vulnerability. In time, these gaps are reduced to
the point where relapses are infrequent and brief because the patient
both knows how to avoid catastrophic situations and how to contain
smaller breakdowns when they occur.
At the same time, the relapse report allows assessment of the
counselor in relation to others at the same facility, and of the facility
with respect to peers. Counselors whose patients experience a dispro-
portionately high number of surprising relapses-those that occur
without prior warning by incursion into life situations that the plan
marks off as potentially hazardous-are plainly failing in their task of
helping the patient to prepare sufficiently detailed and accurate
assessments and plans. Facilities that tolerate a disproportionately
high number of inattentive counselors are in turn failing in their
managerial tasks. Thus the very instrument that renders the program
useful to the particular patient can be used to make the program
accountable to the broader public it serves. Extension of the existing
national monitoring regime of the drug courts to include evaluation of
their capacity to evaluate treatment providers by this and other met-
rics would spur them to make full use of the opportunities that their
constant collaboration with these latter provide.
A second missing piece in the emerging drug court system con-
cerns relations to the providers of complementary services. The clients
of the drug court typically suffer from problems beyond those which
put them within the court's jurisdiction. These other problems can
include: mental illness; physical illness (itself including HIV infection
or AIDS); alcoholism; educational deficits; spotty or no employment
record; inadequate housing or homelessness; and child or spousal
abuse. Both residential and outpatient treatment providers therefore
recognize that drug treatment must be coordinated with a variety of
other services, some of which must begin when the clients enter drug
treatment and others of which can be deferred until they are about to
leave it. These complementary services are all grouped together under
the somewhat misleading rubric of aftercare.
occurs, therapists should encourage patients to analyze [triggering] events to determine how to
avoid using in similar situations in the future.') (Report available at National Inst. on Drub




In coordinating their activities with the providers of aftercare
services, the drug treatment providers face a characteristic dilemma.
If the aftercare provider takes no account of the particular needs of
drug abusers, the service is unlikely to be effective. If, on the other
hand, services such as vocational training or housing are so special-
ized to the needs of drug using clients that they are in effect part of
the treatment program, they may create a sheltered world in which
clients receive no help in preparing themselves for independent exis-
tence in the larger society. The task for drug treatment programs is to
find some form of collaboration with aftercare providers that is spe-
cialized enough to avoid the first trap without being so specialized as
to fall into the second. Caseworkers and managers of treatment pro-
grams with whom we spoke were well aware of this problem. A few
thought that they could solve it by providing the requisite aftercare
services themselves,9' but most were resigned to reliance upon inde-
pendent aftercare providers, chosen on the basis of general reputation
and occasional site visits.
Here, too, it is easy to imagine extensions of the monitoring re-
gime that would leave ample room for experimentation while making
the results of conspicuous successes and failures generally available to
the whole system of treatment courts. The most obvious would be for
treatment courts to evaluate and rank the aftercare providers with
whom they work, based on a series of commonly agreed-upon perform-
ance metrics. This would ensure at a minimum that the second tier
treatment providers were monitored, in addition to providing an addi-
tional vantage point for review of the organizational performance of
first tier providers and drug courts themselves. Eventually it should
be possible to make more systematic judgments about whether drug
treatment providers are better advised to integrate forward into the
provision of aftercare or to contract for such services with independent
providers.
B. Criminalization and Civil Liberties
The monitoring mechanisms we have described address most
but not all of the concerns about the civil liberties of those subject to
the jurisdiction of treatment courts. The easily addressable concerns
include persecution or inadequate service by a treatment provider and
91. For example, in 1999 Phoenix House opened a "Career Academy" in Brooklyn,
combining "long-term residential treatment, intensive job training, and comprehensive medical




errors in judgment by the court, whether malicious or not. Above we
argued that the experimentalist articulation of local knowledge meant
that there was no necessary tradeoff between efficacy and account-
ability. Frequent contact with the court ensures that abusive condi-
tions within treatment programs will usually be detected and cor-
rected; certainly treatment providers are subject to much more
rigorous oversight than we are accustomed to seeing in the case of
other bodies that may abuse individual rights, such as police forces
and prisons. And the emerging national system of inter-local compari-
sons subjects the judicial overseers themselves to a form of oversight
at least as effective as conventional case-by-case appellate review.
Hence, the form of monitoring characteristic of treatment courts is
well-suited for detecting and preventing violations of the rights of
persons subject to their jurisdiction.
But there is a more fundamental civil libertarian objection con-
cerning the treatment court. Some readers, particularly those sympa-
thetic to the "harm reduction" position,92 may suspect that drug courts
take for granted, and indeed may reinforce, a generally misguided
approach to drug addiction. They willfully overlook the possibility that
criminalization of drugs itself causes much of the harm associated
with their use. From this vantage point, the most charitable interpre-
tation of drug courts is as an institution that makes the best of a bad
situation. A less charitable interpretation sees them as actually
making the situation worse by creating incentives for the extension of
the criminal justice system and entrenching criminalization. Critics
may fear that some combination of patronizing officials, who believe
92. The harm reduction movement distinguishes itself from more traditional approaches to
addiction in rejecting the view that abstinence must be the goal for all addicts. See Robert W.
Westermeyer, Reducing Harm: A Very Good Idea (visited July 12, 1999) <http://www.cts.com/
crasbl-habtsmrt//harm.html>. As we have seen, however, mainstream treatment providers
themselves have, in their acceptance of relapse, adopted much of the pragmatism of harm
reduction. The most significant remaining difference concerns the use of methadone. Harm
reducers typically advocate methadone maintenance at fairly high doses as a permanent solution
to heroin addiction, at least for some addicts. See id. There is some clinical evidence to support
this approach. See Eric C. Strain et al., Moderate- vs. High-Dose Methadone in the Treatment of
Opioid Dependence: A Randomized Trial, 281 JAMA 1000 (1999) (finding that high dose
methadone treatment led to significantly greater reduction in illicit opioid use than moderate
dose treatment). By contrast, providers accepting placements from treatment court either
require abstinence immediately following detoxification or utilize methadone solely as a
transitional treatment en route to abstinence. See BROOKLYN TREATMENT COURT, COURT
TREATMENT AND SUPERVISION STRUCTURE 3 (revised Sep. 12, 1998) (setting forth requirements
for treatment band M). However, in recent years, these divisions have become less sharp, as
"[t]he general maturation of the drug treatment field in both theory and practice has gradually
fostered an integrative perspective across different drug-treatment modalities." George De Leon
et al., Passages: A Therapeutic Community Oriented Day Treatment Model for Methadone
Maintained Clients, 27 J. DRUG ISSUES 341, 342 (1997).
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they know what is best for addicts, and treatment providers seeking to
maintain a steady flow of clients will together over-extend the
tentacular reach of the criminal justice system.
In our view, this line of argument understates the harms asso-
ciated with addiction while incorrectly equating coercion with crimi-
nalization. As to the harms of addiction independent of the legal
status of the abused substance, consider alcoholism. No one disputes
that chronic alcohol abuse entails physical degradation of the alcoholic
and incalculable psychological and material burdens for his family,
friends, and associates. Middle-aged heroin addicts maintained on
methadone may be less burdensome to themselves and others than
untreated alcoholics. But there is currently no analogous replacement
treatment for (alcohol or) non-opioid addictive drugs such as cocaine. 3
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the profound abdication of
self-control inherent in addiction will not have devastating side effects
on the self esteem of the addict and through at least that connection,
on the entire tissue of his or her relations.
The insistent decriminalizer may be assuming that treatment
within the criminal justice system is only coercive and that treatment
outside of the criminal justice system is likely to be non-coercive. But
we have already seen how treatment courts use coercion as only one of
many tools in helping the addict cope with his addiction. Now consider
how the forms of coercion associated with drug courts would likely
emerge in treatment programs dealing with legal drugs of abuse.
Recall the characterization of addiction as a chronic relapsing disease.
Despite the diversity of treatment alternatives, it is now nearly con-
ventional among treatment providers that effective treatment com-
bines rewards for successes and graduated sanctions for failures.
Prison may be an especially onerous sanction but it exists on a con-
tinuum that includes shame and exclusion from the fellowship of
others. Drug courts, for their part, recognizing both the special nature
of prison, and its continuity with other sanctions, use it very spar-
ingly. It seems more likely that the quick and sure nature of the sanc-
tion, rather than the specific character of the punishment itself,
determines the therapeutic effect. If this view, which is that of the
93. Animal studies indicate that gamma vinyl-GABA ("GVG'), commonly used to treat
epilepsy in Europe under the name Vigabatrin, and awaiting approval in the United States as
Sabril, may be useful in treating cocaine (as well as nicotine) addiction. See GVG: Targeting the
Brain's Communicators (visited Aug. 9, 1999) <http://www.pet.bnl.gov/GVG.html>. However, it
has not yet been proven safe and effective for humans. See Jamie Talan, A Clamor from the
Desperate/Hundreds Want Role in Human Tests of Anti-Addiction Drug, NEWSDAY, Aug. 25,
1998, at C8.
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drug courts themselves, is correct, then treatment programs wholly
unrelated to the criminal justice system are likely to adopt forms of
monitoring rewards and punishment very similar to those deployed by
the drug courts. This convergence is likely to be reinforced by the
scarcity of resources available for treatment. Thus, one sanction for
non-compliance will be denial of secondary benefits such as housing,
employment assistance, or daycare, and the ultimate sanction for
repeated failure or disruption would likely be exclusion from all but
medically urgent services." Indeed, the boundary between drug court
arrangements and the kind of treatment programs about which we are
conjecturing here is manifestly porous. The drug treatment commu-
nity uniformly draws no distinction between treatment for addiction to
illegal drugs and addiction to alcohol. 5 Given this convergence, drug
courts represent as effective a response to the problem of addiction as
is possible under current law. Judgments will differ but it seems to us
a form of political purism to reject the good in the name of the best.
Moreover, the demonstration that treatment can be effective may
itself prove to be a path to substantial decriminalization.
Granting this, the core to the decriminalizer's argument is the
claim that drug courts can lead to a dangerous expansion in the reach
of the criminal justice system. Many forces converge to heighten the
danger of such an expansion. One is the blurring of professional
boundaries. For example, defense attorneys become part of the treat-
ment team, and thus are less likely to press their clients' rights as
vigorously as they would under normal adversary assumptions. This
argument broadens to the claim that the teamwork inherent in the
drug court poses a general threat to the civil liberties of clients who
depend precisely on familiar professional antagonisms for the vindica-
tion of their rights. Another force for expansion consists of the motives
of criminal justice officials hoping to widen their turf and treatment
providers hoping to fill their facilities. A third source of pressure
would be family members who denounce one of their own, either self-
94. Of course, the actual imposition of such a sanction in any particular case, like the
remand of a drug treatment client to prison (as opposed to a short jail stay), would constitute a
failure. The social cost of terminating treatment, to say nothing of the cost to the addict himself,
will almost always be greater than the cost of giving him one more chance. Thus, just as
treatment courts are quite reluctant to remand clients to prison, so we would expect that
treatment programs unrelated to the criminal justice system would likewise be reluctant to
impose the penalty of exclusion. A sword of Damocles only serves its function while it hangs, not
after it drops.
95. For example, the Key Components, discussed supra notes 34-37, consistently refer to
"alcohol and other drugs" ("AOD") together. See also Office of Justice Programs, Drug Court
Grant Program Fiscal Year 1999 Program Guidelines and Application Kit, supra note 31, at 19.
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ishly to rid themselves of a burden, or desperately to provide treat-
ment where none is otherwise available. '
To make matters still worse, these concerns are more forceful
the better the treatment offered. If the police arrest addicts solely for
the purpose of placing them into sham treatment, this breakdown will
be detected by the treatment court's system of monitoring and through
informal mechanisms-word will spread rapidly among the addict
population, and they will in large numbers insist on their legal right
to trial. But neither the system of monitoring nor the informal addicts'
network will detect a problem if addicts are systematically offered
treatment they regard as useful. Indeed, an addict may decide that it
is better to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit than to go
untreated. Further, because a defense attorney working as part of a
treatment team will not necessarily wish to divert her client to the
ordinary criminal justice system, she may not probe the client for
protestations of innocence.97 Surely there is something wrong with a
system that insists on potentially false confessions of guilt as a condi-
tion of receiving effective drug treatment. Association with the crimi-
nal justice system is itself a stigma, and furthermore, if a client ulti-
mately fails in treatment, then by virtue of the antecedent guilty plea
he will end up in prison.
The availability of a technical legal solution for this unwar-
ranted use of the criminal justice system merely highlights the prob-
lem. Although it cannot be a crime to be a drug addict,98 possession of
heroin, cocaine, and other serious drugs of abuse are crimes under
state and federal law, and an addict who appears under the influence
96. Even without drug courts, there is the possibility that addicts will be "betrayed" in this
way. Most states and the federal government have provisions for the civil commitment of drug
addicts who pose a danger to themselves or others. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Ali J.
Amirshahi, Civil Commitment For Drug Dependency: The Judicial Response, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 39, 42-43 (1992) (citing a 1914 New York state statute as evidence of the long history of
civil commitment statutes); Judith A. Goldberg, Note, Due Process Limitations on Involuntary
Commitment of Individuals Who Abuse Drugs or Alcohol, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1481, 1483-87 (1995)
(describing the typical procedure). Where the civil commitment process for addicts is onerous,
one might worry that treatment court will be used to circumvent it. Where it is easy, that fact
itself provides reasons to worry about threats to liberty quite similar to those raised by the
criminal justice system. See Sherry F. Colb, The Three Faces of Evil, 86 GEO. L.J. 677, 684-89
(1998) (book review) (noting the similarities between confinement in prison and in a nominally
rehabilitative institution).
97. Cf. Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency
Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 79 (1972) (noting the tendency of appointed counsel to accede to
incompetency findings that result in incarceration of their clients).
98. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a California statute
criminalizing narcotics addiction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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of drugs could be stopped on suspicion of illegal possession and ar-
rested if that suspicion is confirmed. Nor is there a constitutional
barrier to the enactment of legislation making it a crime to appear in
public under the influence of narcotics." Thus it ought to be possible to
make all addicts criminals, putting the criminal justice system within
its rights in offering its services to all comers. But this is of course a
burlesque-in the name of ensuring that only criminal offenders are
subject to the coercive power of treatment court, the police and the
legislature are invited to expand the scope of criminalization.
The answer to these risks, we believe, is not to attack drug
courts, but to fight for treatment as effective as that which they pro-
vide outside of the criminal justice system. That some addicts whose
rights have been violated may prefer to submit to the supervision of
drug courts rather than seek justice is an indictment of the real
choices that current social policy affords. The obvious parallel is to
persons who find themselves in such desperate circumstances that
they commit crimes for the purpose of obtaining food and shelter in
prison. But just as no sensible policymaker faced with this latter
phenomenon would advocate making prisons more hellish as a solu-
tion to poverty and homelessness, so the proper response to the
limited availability of treatment outside of the criminal justice system
is to increase its availability, rather than to shut down the drug
courts." To any but advocates of a politique dupire, the objection thus
points the way to necessary further steps, rather than a reason for
retreat.
99. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1968) (holding that a Texas statute
criminalizing public intoxication is not cruel and unusual punishment).
100. Even when Medicaid funding for drug treatment is nominally available on an equal
footing for mandated and non-mandated clients, the latter do not usually receive the assistance
the former receive in demonstrating eligibility and finding a placement, or run unacceptable
risks if they enter treatment. See Nina Bernstein, Welfare Officials to Search Records of Drug
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at Al (reporting plans of the Giuliani Administration to
search Medicaid reimbursement records to detect whether welfare applicants had received drug
or alcohol treatment). And for those ineligible for Medicaid, funding is typically inadequate.
Despite the enactment of the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2944 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. 1996), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. 1997)), most
employer-sponsored health insurance plans place severe restrictions on funding for substance
abuse treatment. See Jeffrey A. Buck et al., Behavioral Health Benefits in Employer-Sponsored
Health Plans, 1997, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 67 (Mar./Apr. 1999). The root of the problem may be
that the disease model of addiction has not yet gained wide acceptance among the public or in
the law. For example, the Americans With Disabilities Act specifically excludes from its
coverage "psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs." 42




In addition to the civil liberties concerns we have just ad-
dressed, the blurring of roles among prosecutors, defense attorneys,
courts, and treatment providers raises urgent questions about the
allocation of power among the branches of government. Bluntly, the
fear is of the creation in the treatment courts of a parallel govern-
ment-a set of bodies combining administrative and judicial functions
that is sufficiently lodged inside current institutions to be protected by
the nimbus of their legitimacy, yet not subject to the familiar rivalries
between branches of government that prevent abuses of public power.
As with the civil libertarian concerns, these fears are not ungrounded.
Recall, in particular, the collaborative construction and implementa-
tion of drug courts through the convocation of teams drawn from the
different branches of government (as well as the private and not-for-
profit sectors) and induced, as part of the construction of a nascent
institution, to form bonds that at least soften, and may completely
extinguish, the organizational rivalries that otherwise make them
mindful of one another's overreaching. At a minimum this collabora-
tion creates in every jurisdiction that establishes a drug court an
implicit coalition of powerful political actors who will tolerate its exis-
tence, even if they are themselves unenthusiastic about its purposes
and prospects. Surely the creation of such a consensus partly explains
the insulation of drug courts from the acrimony of public debate about
drug use and the treatment of drug offenders. But to passionate advo-
cates of either the decriminalization of drug use or the harshest
punishment of drug users, the judicious accommodation of insiders
will seem a conspiracy of silence.
Moreover, treatment courts are not alone in posing the threat
that the conventional restraints on abuses of government power will
be circumvented. Related, and in some variants, plainly convergent,
movements for family, juvenile, and community courts, community
policing, and reform of institutions like child protective services and
public schools are also being built in a way that co-opts potential
watchdogs by making them part of the team responsible for
generating solutions."0' Members of this implicit league of reformers
may be willing to gloss over one another's overweening on the charita-
ble grounds that all experiments entail mistakes or out of the cynical
101. See Rottman & Casey, supra note 2, at 13. For a flavor of these movements, and the
federal role as pooler and disseminator, see the material available at the National Criminal
Justice Reference Service (visited Aug. 10, 1999) <www.ncjrs.org>.
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expectation that should they encounter difficulties one hand will wash
the other.
There is an obvious, but misleading answer to this objection-
in each case we can point to formal indicia of accountability. For
example, by funding the Department of Justice grant programs,
Congress authorized the extension of the drug court model, as did the
state and local government officials who created drug courts. And to
return to a familiar point, the flow of information and comparison
ensures that they operate in plain view. To judge them by the
currently operative legal standard, the forms of delegation here result
in more accountability than typically associated with the
administrative state. But this response is misleading because it
invites us to interpret drug courts within conventional categories,
when the line of development of drug courts and like institutions
transforms the roles of all relevant actors. It would be at best
disingenuous to argue on the one hand that treatment courts operate
by novel principles, distinct from those of traditional courts and
agencies, and yet argue on the other that, as regards their democratic
authorization, they are (somehow) sufficiently like these latter to
count as legitimate. Thus, we need to face the anomalous character of
treatment courts in our democratic order, and to do so we must briefly
draw out some implications of experimentalism as a national system
of democratic governance.
Earlier we discussed the constant and reciprocal redefinition of
means and ends at the heart of experimentalist institutions. Local
agents, in devising solutions to problems given existing knowledge,
cumulatively revise both our understanding of the problems to be
solved and the means available for their solution. A condition of this
rolling redefinition of means and ends is transparent discussion of
successes and failures of simultaneous experiments, and this condition
explains why, in this system, efficacy and accountability can augment,
rather than be traded off against, each other. The same logic of
redefinition as applied to problems of democratic authorization and
the delegation of legislative authority suggests a concomitant redefini-
tion of the roles of Congress and other national entities. An experi-
mentalist Congress will decreasingly enact statutes containing all of
the details about implementation. Nor (per the post-New Deal pat-
tern) will it declare policy and delegate to administrative agencies the
authority to .write rules and bring enforcement actions that ostensibly
carry out that policy. Instead, the legislative function will increasingly
consist in the identification of a problem and simultaneous authoriza-
tion of local experimentation on condition that the experimentalist
entities (state, local, or ad hoc assemblies of smaller or larger groups)
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assure rights of democratic access to relevant participants, fully dis-
close their methods and results, and submit to evaluations comparing
performance across jurisdictions.
The resulting accountability is not of the Madisonian sort, in
which power is divided among distinct representative units, and delib-
eration-in the sense of disinterested preference-changing reflection-
is the province of a senatorial elite removed from ordinary politics.
Nonetheless, the experimentalist form of accountability could be con-
sidered neo-Madisonian because it harnesses competition among
institutions to ensure that they all act in the public interest. The
Madisonian scheme plays rival branches and levels of government
against one another; the emerging superstructure of institutions like
drug courts would instead utilize the pooled experience of diverse, and
in some sense competing, jurisdictions to ensure accountability. In
place of senatorial deliberation at a distance, experimentalism empha-
sizes the capacity of practical problem-solving activity to reveal new
possibilities and thus to open the way for solutions that are different
from the vector sum of current interests.
As a current example of an effort to achieve this kind of ex-
perimentalist accountability and of its potential effects on the respec-
tive roles of Congress, administrative agencies, and local actors,
consider a recent proposal to amend the Endangered Species Act of
1973.02 The proposed legislation (the 'Miller Bill") 3 is itself a response
to a burst of experimentalist decentralization in environmental
regulation with strong parallels to the developments we have traced in
the drug courts. The original Endangered Species Act often created a
stalemate. Once species were listed as endangered, development of
their habitats had to cease, thereby enraging those interested in
development, without actually appeasing those concerned with
protecting the environment. By the time a habitat was sufficiently
degraded to result in the listing of a species, ceasing development by
itself was insufficient to reverse the decline, and, absent a program of
active habitat restoration, the local economy would languish while the
endangered species became extinct. The logjam was eventually broken
through the creation of Habitat Conservation Plans ("HCPs"), as a
variant on the "incidental take" permitting process established by the
ESA." HCPs allow developers, environmental groups, and public
authorities to, in effect, obtain an exemption from the application of
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
103. H.R. 960, 106th Cong. (1999).
104. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2)(i), (iv) (1998) (stating
that the taking will be incidental).
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the ESA on the condition that they establish a local plan for habitat
protection as well as a system for monitoring progress and revising
their goals and methods as the need arises. Some development is
allowed to continue so long as the overall condition of the relevant
habitat is improved." However, the defect of the HCP process is the
absence of a national or regional system for monitoring local self-
monitoring. HCPs vary greatly in the rigor of the goals they set, the
comprehensiveness of their self-evaluations, and the accessibility of
their decisionmaking processes to concerned parties.
The Miller Bill would rectify this situation by authorizing the
Department of the Interior to permit the formation of HCPs on condi-
tion that the HCP participants, along with the agency, set measurable
goals for themselves," monitor actively, ' and assure democratic
access." Passage of the Miller Bill would, first, change the role of the
Department of the Interior. Instead of relying on its own expertise and
judgment to help craft the agreements and determine their accept-
ability, the Department would be responsible for policing a framework
within which a broad and open circle of local and national participants
can determine whether particular HCPs are meeting the goals they
set for themselves, and whether the institution taken as a whole is
likewise meeting its goals. Accordingly, Congress's role would shift as
well. In addition to authorizing the broad experimentalist regime, its
oversight activity would consist of checking to see that the Depart-
ment of the Interior is effectively provoking self-reflection among the
local actors. In monitoring the Department's effectiveness in encour-
aging local HCP plans to monitor themselves, Congress would also
obtain highly contextualized knowledge. By what is now a familiar
105. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 101-02
(1997) (describing examples of how HCPs have been successful).
106. H.R. 960, § 105 (proposing to amend 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(C)(ii) so as to require
"objective, measurable criteria, including habitat needs and population levels, that, when met,
would result in a determination ... [that a] species be removed from the lise' of endangered
species).
107. The Miller Bill contains numerous monitoring requirements. See, e.g., H.R. 960, § 105
(proposing to amend 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f(5)(B)(ii) to require HCPs to "set forth specific agency
actions, timetables, and funding required to achieve and monitor progress of these recovery goals
or management responsibilities"); H.R. 960, § 108 (proposing to amend 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(vii) to require HCPs to include "[m]easures the applicant will take to monitor the
effectiveness of the plan's conservation measures in achieving the plan's biological goals and
impacts on recovery of each species").
108. See H.R. 960, § 108 (proposing to amend 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(10)(D)(i) to oblige the
Secretary of the Interior to "ensure the participation of a broad range of public and private
interests in the development of' each HCP).
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form of seeming paradox, the deep delegation of authority goes hand
in hand with a greater capacity for oversight.'"
In the case of drug courts, the infrastructure of national infor-
mation pooling is being created simultaneously with the drug courts
themselves. Instead of a center that issues waivers from its own direc-
tives and then reconstitutes itself in light of the needs of the ensuing
decentralization, the drug courts are simultaneously constituting
themselves with and through the Justice Department's Drug Courts
Program Office, the Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assis-
tance Project, and the National Association of Drug Court Profes-
sionals. But putting aside the different sequences by which these
experimentalist regimes are taking shape, the Miller Bill would create
similar structural outcomes. In authorizing the award of federal plan-
ning and implementation grants for drug courts, Congress required a
Government Accounting Office study of their effectiveness,' and as
drug courts continue to proliferate, it is easy to imagine that Congress
would require continual reporting by the Department of Justice or
other entities directly involved in the drug court system. The resultant
system of authorization and monitoring would be architecturally
equivalent to the one envisioned by the Miller Bill.
With regard to democratic participation, however, there
remains a substantial difference between HCPs and related experi-
mentalist programs on the one hand, and the drug courts on the other.
Directly deliberative problem solving is a feature of both. Relapse
planning by the user/client and treatment counselor under the super-
vision of the drug court is, as we saw, an effort to bring general thera-
peutic principles to bear on the problems of individuals with a view
both to helping particular patients and to extracting general lessons
from their experience. In this sense it is very much like the kind of
analysis of local ecosystems undertaken by developers and conserva-
tionists in the HCP setting. The difference, of course, is that addiction,
almost by definition, entails a loss of autonomy, and, hence, a (tempo-
rarily) limited capacity to participate autonomously in problem solv-
ing. The acceptance of coercion as a treatment method is a blunt ac-
knowledgment of this condition.
109. Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, 24 BOSTON REV. (1999)
available at <http//www.bostonreview.mit.edu/br24.5/contents.html>
110. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 1955 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 3796ii (1994)). The resulting report is GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS,
GAO/GGD-97-106 (July 31, 1997).
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Nonetheless, the difference is less profound than it might at
first appear. In settings such as HCPs and other experimentalist
programs there are always experts whose expertise in some sense
imposes constraints on the autonomy of other participants, even
though the emphasis on local knowledge and broader comparisons
limits the effect of these differentials. Conversely, in the treatment
court setting, even though addicts' relapses are expected, over time
they typically become shorter and shorter interruptions of longer
periods of self-discipline and recovery. Moreover, in the increased
attention that treatment providers have, in recent years, been paying
to particular client populations-women, juveniles, the homeless, and
so forth-we can see an emerging responsiveness to community inter-
ests."' Finally, treatment courts can be expected to collaborate more
and more closely with other (often experimentalist) institutions such
as vocational training or community policing programs that are not
directed exclusively to addict populations; and thus forms of client
participation that develop in these may well be adapted to the specific
needs of treatment courts. In short, it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that, coercive as they are, treatment courts at their best are poten-
tially more participatory than many wholly uncoercive programs of
representative democracy.
And what of large choices between mutually contradictory poli-
cies-for example, between a punitive and therapeutic approach to
drug offenses-that is central to the familiar politics of representative
democracy? Here we can speculate that the legislative fate of the drug
courts will provide a crude test of the shaping effect of direct delib-
eration on politics. The original and continuing authorization for
federal funding of drug courts was the result of a classic instance of
logrolling. In the same appropriations measures that funded this and
other experimentalist programs, Congress also authorized more tradi-
tional approaches to drugs and crime, such as building more prisons
and hiring more police, which it funded much more generously."' The
comparative "experiment" is flawed, to be sure-whereas drug courts
and similarly structured institutions provide the information for
assessing their performance, many more traditional programs do not.
111. See generally COMMUNITY AS METHOD: THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES FOR SPECIAL
POPULATIONS AND SPECIAL SETTINGS (George De Leon ed., 1997).
112. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3769 (authorizing prison construction), 3796bb (1994) (authorizing
funding rural drug enforcement). For example, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Justice
Programs was appropriated $30 million for drug courts and $555.5 million for prison




Nonetheless, we can expect that the experience of the drug
courts will transform future debate-partly by provoking questions
about why other programs do not self-monitor and self-report, and
partly by breaking down the distinction between incarceration and
treatment. As illustrations of the latter, consider two examples. The
first is an Arizona variant of the typical drug court pattern. "Unlike
the drug courts springing up around the country, which offer offenders
treatment as an alternative to trial and a criminal record, Arizona
sentences drug offenders to treatment once they have been convicted
or plead guilty, and tailors the regimen to the particular drug depend-
ency."' Despite this difference, the Arizona approach has yielded
results similar to those of the drug courts we have described, "4 indi-
cating that drug courts can stand in a variety of relations to more
traditional approaches to criminal justice. As a second example of the
slippage between incarceration and treatment, consider the fact that
many of the people active in the drug court movement have argued for
increased use of drug treatment within prisons," and the Department
of Justice has been charged with helping states pursue this goal."6
We do not suggest that the appearance of experimentalist insti-
tutions heralds the inevitable demise of traditional politics. In the case
of the HCP proposal, for example, ranching, lumber, development and
other interest groups may conclude that even if the HCP process is
preferable to command and control, they can do better still by fighting
federal regulation in general, and these groups certainly have means
of influencing the political process. So too, drug courts could fall victim
to the war on drugs. But given that it is the very success of drug
courts (and other experimentalist institutions) that will focus public
attention on them, we think it at least as likely that such attention
113. Christopher S. Wren, Arizona Saves Money by Treating, Rather than Jailing, Drug
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999 , at A14.
114. See generally ARIZONA SUPREME COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
ADULT SERVICES DmSION, DRUG TREATMENT & EDUCATION FUND LEGISLATIVE REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 1997-1998 (Mar. 1999). There is, however, significant room for improvement of self-
monitoring. An independent audit of the Arizona program concluded that the probation system
would be improved were it to "[s]upervise probationers with special attention paid to completing
substance abuse," to ensure that a higher percentage of probationers ordered to attend
counseling and receive treatment actually do so. Adult Probation Programs, State of Arizona
Office of the Auditor General Performance Audit, Rep. No. 99-4, at 16-17 (March 1999) (visited
Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us>.
115. See Nat'l Ass'n of Drug Court Profs., A Comprehensive National Drug Court Systems Act
(visited June 28, 1999) <http://www.drugcourt.orgldocs/cmpact.htm>.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796ff (1994) (authorizing grants for the purpose of substance abuse
treatment programs within prisons). The federal fiscal year 1998 appropriation for state prison
drug treatment program grants was $63 million. See Office of Justice Programs Annual Report,
supra note 112, at 8.
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will lead to further express authorization. While there is no guarantee
that the conventionally accountable institutions-legislatures--will,
when faced with the choice, vote to further institutionalize the ex-
perimentalist unconventionally accountable institutions, the political
process that makes this choice will necessarily be shaped by the ex-
perience of the latter.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of treatment courts as part of an emergent neo-
Madisonian architecture of democracy, in which the traditional sepa-
ration of powers plays a subordinate part, invites a final, insistent
question rooted in the requirements of our current, Madisonian sys-
tem: Whatever their other roles, can treatment courts articulate the
constitutional and other entrenched values whose protection is now in
large measure entrusted to the judiciary? Our answer is that they can.
Indeed, precisely because of its experimentalist character, the treat-
ment court can do better as a court in serving this function than tradi-
tional judicial institutions.
Courts that collaborate with experimentalist institutions have
a considerable advantage over courts in traditional settings-access to
the rich record of the parties' activities that experimentalist monitor-
ing helps to create. In unusual cases such as treatment courts, the
advantage is greater still because the treatment court is simultane-
ously part of the monitoring system and responsible for defending
entrenched values.
Consider a dramatic example. The pioneering American thera-
peutic community, Synanon, featured many elements familiar from
modern therapeutic communities-group therapy, peer counseling,
and patient responsibility for running the home."7 It also turned out to
be a cult whose practices included "forced shaving of heads (of
members and nonmembers), sterilization of all males within the group
(except the leader, Chuck Dederich), coerced abortions, forced
breakups of marriages and other relationships, beatings and other
attacks, and harassment of past members and nonmembers.""' 8
Nonetheless, prior to the publicization of these abuses, "Synanon had
received great acclaim as an unprecedentedly effective drug-
117. See LEWIS YABLONSKY, THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY 17-26 (1989); see also Douglas S.
Lipton, Therapeutic Conmunities: History, Effectiveness and Prospects, 60 CORRECTIONS TODAY
106, 107-09 (1998) ("Synanon... bears many similarities to today's Phoenix House and Daytop
Village programs, although these programs tend to be considerably less intense.").
118. MARYBETH F. AYELLA, INSANE THERAPY: PORTRAIT OF A PSYCHOTHERAPY CULT 9 (1998).
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rehabilitation group.'. 9 Suppose a drug court were inadvertently to
place clients in a latter-day Synanon. What legal consequences would
follow?
Were a prison to inflict upon an inmate the sort of brutality
meted out by Synanon, surely the inmate would have a valid claim of
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, even if
the prison was nominally private.'20 The same, it seems quite clear,
should be true for someone sent to a treatment facility involuntarily.'
Although it could be argued that by voluntarily submitting to the
jurisdiction of the treatment court, defendants waive their rights later
to sue, this line of reasoning is plainly implausible. Prison inmates do
not forfeit their right to be free of cruel treatment by virtue of having
pleaded guilty, and thus neither would drug treatment clients.
But although the role of protector of rights is a familiar one for
courts, note how in the context of what is arguably the most important
right of convicted offenders, the treatment court is actually better
suited to this function than the traditional court. The treatment court
need not wait for plaintiffs to file suit alleging abusive conditions, nor
must it sift through countless frivolous allegations to find the scat-
tered meritorious ones. The treatment court detects abuses in the
ordinary course of monitoring-in the now familiar sense of requiring
self-monitoring and reporting-the actors that pose threats to rights.
Had Synanon's clients been required to make regular appearances in
treatment court, its abuses could not have remained undetected for
long.
Finally, note again how an experimentalist court's protection
for and elaboration of rights connects accountability to effectiveness.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "'unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain'.., constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
119. 1d; see also Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 967, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(revoking Synanon's tax-exempt status).
120. The federal courts have found that private prisons and their employees act under color
of state law, for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when sued by inmates. See, e.g., Street v.
Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding the defendant correction
corporation was acting under the color of state law when it performed the traditional state
function of operating a prison); Kesler v. King, 29 F. Supp. 2d 356, 370-71 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(holding the defendant subject to liability under § 1983 because it was a private actor acting
under the color of state law); Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247-51
(D.N.M. 1998) (same).
121. See LeMoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 498, 502-03 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (holding a juvenile treatment facility is a state actor), rev'd in part on other grounds, 174
F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 1999).
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ment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.' '  Although there are
cases in which it is obvious that this standard has been met,' the
requirement that pain be "unnecessary" requires the reviewing court
to know what is (and is not) necessary to the achievement of valid
penological objectives. This, in turn, leads to the unpalatable alterna-
tives of deference to prison authorities-which ensures that abuses
will go uncorrected--or imperious and uninformed pronouncements
about the functioning of institutions far removed from the court. By
contrast, in an experimentalist setting, the court reviews a record
designed specifically to reveal what practices are effective. Thus, far
from exacerbating the legitimacy problems surrounding much judicial
activity, the role shifts that experimentalism heralds go a substantial
way towards alleviating them.
In public debate, the criminal justice system appears to stand
firmly on one side of an intractable ideological disagreement about
how even to categorize the problem of drug abuse. Indeed few other
divisions in our society appear to be so refractory. The very existence
of treatment courts is remarkable, their rapid diffusion, provisional
successes, and continual experimentalist self-examination doubly so.
Further progress of drug courts and related institutions is hardly
assured, but there is no compelling reason to believe that the obstacles
they face are greater than the ones they have already overcome.
Surely there is hope for the renewal of our public institutions in this
surprising success.
122. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976) (in turn quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))).
123. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (finding that guards' recreational beating
of an inmate was cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate did not suffer
permanent injury).
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